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Notes and Comment
Bills and Notes: Defenses: Usury.-The case of Sabine v.
Paine, 223 N. Y. 401 (roI8), involved an action upon a negotiable
promissory note transferred by the payee to the plaintiff, a holder in
due course. The defendant, the maker, pleaded the defense of usury,
and this defense was held effective even as against a holder in due
course.
The court in reaching this conclusion had difficulty in reconciling an
apparent inconsistency between the Negotiable Instruments Law and
the General Business Law of the State of New York. The General
Business Law' provides in section 370 that "The rate of interest upon
a loan or forbearance of any money, goods or things in action, except
as otherwise provided by law, shall be six dollars upon one hundred
dollars, for one year, and at that rate, for a greater or less sum, or for
a longer or shorter time." Section 373 provides, "All bonds, bills,
notes * * * whereupon or whereby there shall be reserved or
taken, * * * any greater sums, or greater value for the loan or
forbearance of any money * * * than is above prescribed shall
be void. * * * Whenever it shall satisfactorily appear by the
admissions of the defendant, or by proof, that any bond, bill, note,
assurance, pledge, tonveyance, contract, security or any evidence of
debt has been taken or received in violation of the foregoing provisions,
the court shall declare the same to be void, and enjoin any prosecution
thereon, and order the same to be surrendered and cancelled."
Section 96 of the Negotiable Instruments Law,2 provides that "A
holder in due course holds the instrument free from any defect of title
of prior parties and free from defenses available to prior parties
among themselves, and may enforce payment of the instrument for the
full amount thereof against all parties liable thereon."
Assuming the plaintiff to be a holder in due course, the question
presented to the court was whether section 96 of the Negotiable
Instruments Law repealed by implication section 373 of the General
Business Law, or whether they may be reconciled.
Before the Negotiable Instruments Law was enacted in this state,
it was well established that a usurious note was absolutely void by
statute and had no legal efficacy whatever, even in the hands of a
holder in due course. 3 The court in the case last cited said that "a
note void in its inception for usury continues void forever, whatever
its subsequent history may be. It is as void in the hands of an
innocent holder for value as it was in the hands of those who made
the usurious contract. No vitality can be given to it by sale or
exchange, because that which the statute has declared void cannot
be made valid by passing through the channels of trade." The
'Consol. Laws

19o9, Chap. 20.
2Consol. Laws I909, Chap. 38.
'Claflin v. Boorum, 122 N. Y. 385, 388 (189o).
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holder in due course is4bound to know at his peril the character of the
paper he is dealing in.
After the enactment of the Negotiable Instruments Law it was
held by a number of courts of inferior jurisdiction in New York that
Section 96 of the Negotiable Instruments Law repealed Sections 370
to 373 of the General Business Law in so far as concerned a holder in
due course.- The Court of Appeals itself had held that where a bank
has in good faith discounted negotiable paper for value before
maturity without notice that it was void for usury, the defense of
usury is not available to the drawer.6 This case, however, did not
necessarily involve the question presented in the principal case, as the
court's conclusion may rest upon the claim that the rights of the bank
were determined by the State Banking Law, section 74,7 and that the
Negotiable Instruments Law had no application.
The rule now announced by the Court of Appeals that usury it an
absolute defense, does not constitute an exception to the rule that a
holder in due course is exempt from defenses available to prior parties
among themselves. The statute declares the usurious note void.
The language is peremptory and unequivocal. A note which is void
by statute is no note at all. It is nothing more than a piece of paper,
and no legal rights can possibly be based upon it no matter who owns
it. Furthermore, a repeal of a prior statute is to be avoided whenever
possible. If a subsequent statute may be construed one way as well
as another and the words are consistent with an intent not to change
or repeal an existing law, such construction should be given to them.The decision in the principal case removes all doubt in New York on
this perplexing question, and seems to be sound. It is in line with
the decisions in other jurisdictions. 9
Charles Warren Little, '2o.
4
Eastman
5

v. Shaw, 65 N. Y. 522 (1875); Miller v. Zeimer, ixI N. Y. 441 (1888)Schlesinger v. Kelly, 114 App. Div. (N. Y.) 546, 554 (19o6); The Broadway
Trust Co. v. Manheim, 47 Misc. (N. Y.) 415 (905); Klar v. Kostiuk, 65 Misc.
(N. Y.) 199 (igog); Oeser & Co. v. Behrend, 89 Misc. (N. Y.) 391 (1915);

Kennedy v. Heyman, 167 N. Y. Supp. 311 (1917); Emanuel v. Misicke, 149 N.
Y.6 Supp. 905 (1914).
7Schlesinger v. Gilhooly, 189 N. Y. i (1907).

Schlesinger v. Gilhooly, supra, note 6. "Every bank and private and individual banker doing business in this state may take, receive, reserve and charge on
every loan and discount made, or upon any note, bill of exchange or other evidence
of debt, interest at the rate of six per centum per annum; and such interest may
be taken in advance, reckoning the days for which the note, bill or evidence of
debt has to run. The knowingly taking, receiving, reserving or charging
a greater rateofinterest shall beheld and adjudged a forfeiture of the entire interest
which the note, bill or evidence of debt carries with it, or which has been agreed
to be paid thereon. If a greater rate of interest has been paid, the person paying
the same or his legal representatives may recover back twice the amount of the
interest thus paid from the bank and the private or individual banker taking or

receiving the same, if such action is brought within two years from the time the

excess of interest is taken.
* * *The true intent and meaning of this section
is to place and continue banks, and private and individual bankers on an equality
in the particulars herein referred to with the national banks organized under the
act of Congress, entitled 'An act to provide a national currency secured by pledges
of United States bonds and to provide for the circulation and redemption, thereof,'
approved June the third, eighteen hundred and sixty-four."
"Dissent in Oeser & Co. v. Behrend, supra, note 5.
'Twentieth Street Bank v. Jacobs, 74 W. Va. 525 (1914); Perry Savings Bank v.

Fitzgerald, 167 Iowa 446 (1914); Lawson v. First National Bank of Fulton, 31
Ky. Law Rep. 318 (1907); Eskridge v. Thomas, 79 W. Va. 322 (1916).

CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
Bills and Notes: Relation of bank and depositor: Duty to use
care in drawing check.-In the case of London JointStock Bank, Ltd.
v. Macmillan ' Arthur, (19x8) App. Cas. (Eng.) 777, the facts were
as follows: the firm of Macmillan and Arthur employed a confidential clerk, who frequently presented small checks, drawn'by himself,
to one of the partners for signature, the purpose being to secure petty
cash for the office. In one of these checks, when signed by a partner,
the space left for the words indicating the amount was vacant, and the
figure £2 appeared in the space left for the figure, but with room for
the insertion of another figure before and after it. The clerk took the
check, increased the amount to £120, wrote the words "One hundred
and twenty pounds" on the line left blank for the amount, cashed the
check for £z2o, and absconded with the money. The bank sought
to clarge the firm's account with the full £12o. The House of Lords
unanimously held that the bank might charge the check to the firm
for the full amount indicated thereon.
This holding would seem to settle the English law on a question
which has occasioned much confusion. The opinion of Lord Finlay,
L. C., contains an elaborate review of all the English authority on the
subject. In the much cited case of Young v. Grote,' which arose in
1827, the Court of Common Pleas reached the same result as does the
principal case; but in subsequent cases, 2 there was much discussion
of the reasons for the holding, and eventually the rule came to be
doubted,3 and Young v. Grote was treated as over-ruled. 4 The
principal case harmonizes the various decisions; shows that in practically every case, the result can be explained in accordance with the
rule contended for, and treats Colonial Bank of Australasiav. Marshall,5 the only really conflicting case, as erroneous.
The theory underlying the rule has caused much discussion; it is
clearly stated by Lord Shaw of Dunfermline as follows: "Upon the
other part there are obligations resting upon the customer. In the
first place his cheque must be unambiguous and must be ex facie in
such a condition as not to arouse any reasonable suspicion. But it
follows from that that it is the duty of the customer, should his own
business or other requirements prevent him from personally presenting it, to take care to frame and fill up his cheque in such a
manner that when it passes out of his, the customer's, hands it will not
be so left that before presentation, alterations, interpolations, etc.,
can be readily made upon it without giving reasonable ground for
suspicion to the banker that they did not form part of the original
body of the cheque~when signed. To neglect this duty of carefulness
is a negligence cognizable by law. The consequences of such negligence fall alone upon the party guilty of it, namely, the customer. "
The rule is thus limited in its application to checks, to cases where the
14
Bing. (Eng. Com. Pleas) 253 (1827).
2
3 Robarts v. Tucker, x6 Q. B. s6o (1851); Barker v. Sterne, 9 Exch. 684 (1854).
Scholfield v. Earl of Londesborough, (1896) App. Cas. 514, 520 (the opinion
of Lord Halsbury, L. C.).
'Colonial
Bank of Australasia v. Marshall, (I9o6) App. Cas. 559.
6
Supra, note 4.
6p. 824 of the opinion.
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question arises between the bank and the customer, and where the
negligence is in the manner of drawing the check.
Many American courts have misunderstood the rule of Young v.
Grote, and the reason therefor, and have misapplied the doctrine of
that case, extending it to other negotiable instruments, and to cases
arising between parties other than the drawer and drawee.7 Various
reasons are given for these decisions; it is most often said that the
negligence of the maker in executing the instrument has made him
liable to a holder in due course, even as to a stipulation, (as to place
of payment, rate of interest, etc.,) inserted in blanks left by him. 8
This situation, however, is now quite generally covered by the
Negotiable Instruments Law.9 In other cases, arising before the
passage of the act, it has been recognized that the decision in Young v.
Grote rests upon the peculiar relation between banker and depositor. 10
It has been held that the Negotiable Instruments Law" changes the
rule laid down in the principal case. 2 But it does not seem that the
section relied upon diminishes the duty of the customer to his banker
to use due care in preparing the instrument; in other cases arising in
jurisdictions where the Negotiable Instruments Law is in effect,
including the principal case, no such effect is given to the statutory
provision. 3
In New York, the duty of the depositor toward the bank is recognized, by cases arising both 4before and since the passage of the
Negotiable Instruments Law.'
It is generally stated that the extent of the depositor's duty is to
leave no blanks and to do no other negligent affirmative act which
would facilitate fraudulent alteration. In the principal case, however, there is, in the opinion written by Lord Shaw of Dunfermline,
an intimation that the duty may be further extended: "My Lords,
I do not here pronounce any judgment upon another type of case
which may be figured. I refer to a case in which there has been no
negligence on the part of the customer in the respect last alluded to,
but in which erasures of great skill or deletions, say accomplished by
chemical aid, have been made upon a cheque so as to undo all the
care properly exeroised by the customer in regard to its contents.
Yet I cannot conceal from your Lordships that I should have the
greatest doubt as to whether-this kind of roguery having been
practised during that period of responsibility on the part of the customer to which I have referred-the customer would not also be
7

For a large collection of such cases, see 8 Corp. Tur. 735.
104 Ala. 58o (1894); Yocum v. Smith, 63 IM.321 (r872). New York Neg. Instr. Law, see. 33.
"OGreenfield Savings Bank v. Stowell, 123 Mass. 196 (1877); Holmes v. Trumper,
g2 Mich. 427 (871).
"New York Neg. Instr. Law, see. 205: "Where a negotiable instrument is
materially altered without the assent of all parties liable thereon, it is avoided,
except as against a party who has himself made, authorized or assented to the
alteration and subsequent indorsers."
12Commercial Bank v. Arden, 177 Ky. 520 (1917).
13Timbel v. Garfield National Bank, 121 App. Div. (N. Y.) 870 (1907).
'Crawford v. West Side Bank, ioo N. Y. 5o (1885); Critten v. Chemical
National Bank, i7i N. Y. 219 (1902); Timbel v. Garfield National Bank, supra,
note 13.

sWinter v. Pool,
9
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liable."'" This statement is purely dictum, and it may be questioned
whether it does not state the customer's duty a little too broadly.
There is surely no authority in America for saying that a business man
is bound to use a check protector or other criminal proof apparatus in
checks, to protect himself from the machinations of the
drawing
18
forger.
Richard H. Brown, 'i9.
Comparative Law: Municipal Corporations: Tort liability.It is a well established rule in the United States that municipal
corporations are not subject to tort actions when the damage results
from the execution of governmental powers. The principle was
affirmed in City of Hattiesburg v. Geigor, 79 So. (Miss.) 846 (i918),
where the municipal corporation was held not to be liable for the
negligence of one fireman in injuring another. Dillon,1 discussing the
exemption of the municipal corporation from negligence by acts of
firemen, says, "The exemption from liability in these and the like
cases is upon the ground that the service is performed by the corporation in obedience to an act of the legislature; is one in which the
corporation, as such, has no particular interest, and from which it
derives no special benefit in its corporate capacity; that the members
of the fire department, although appointed, employed, and paid by the
city corporation, are not the agents and servants of the city, for
whose conduct it is liable; but they act rather as officers of the city,
charged with a public service, for whose negligence in the discharge of
official duty no action lies against the city, without being expressly
given; the maxim of respondeat superior has, therefore, no application." The idea that the government is not liable in such cases seems
to have arisen from the application of the principles of Roman Law,
and the adoption of the monarchical principle that, "the sovereign can
do no wrong." 2 Motives of policy in building up a strong administrative system favored the survival and application of such a doctrine.
On the continent of Europe the rule is that the government may
not only be sued by an individual in contract, but also in tort, where
the tortious act is not committed in the performance of functions of
a distinctly legal character, and where the fault of the officer causing
it is not purely personal to himself, but consists rather in bad service,
in an order badly given, not understood, or imprudently or carelessly
executed.3 In France the administrative courts tend toward comIsAt p. 825.

' 6 "The question of negligence cannot arise unless the depositor has, in drawing
his check, left blanks unfilled, or by some affirmative act of negligence has facilitated the commission of a fraud by those into whose hands the check may come."
Ruger, C. J., in Crawford v. West Side Bank, supra, note 14, at p. 55. "Now,
while the drawer of a check may be liable where he draws the instrument in such
an incomplete state as to facilitate or invite fraudulent alterations, it is'not the
law that he is bound so to prepare the check that nobody else can successfully
taniper with it. Cullen, J., in Critten v. Chemical National Bank, supra, note 14,
at 1p. 224.
notes 17 and 18.
2Dillon, Mun. Cor., (5th ed.), sec. 166o; i9R. C. L. 1107,
Goodnow, Principles of Administrative Law of the United States, p. 383.
32 Goodnow, Comparative Administrative Law, p. 161.
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pensation against the state for actes de gestion, i. e., acts done in the
course of the business administration of the public service, not only
when done wholly without legal authority, but also when there has
been an abuse of that authority for improper purposes, or even negligence, as for example, where a merchantman has been damaged by
collision with a warship. 4 At first glance it would seem, therefore,
that in France the government is a juristic person in much the same
way as the private person or corporation, but the apparent liberality
is refuted by an inspection of the procedure for obtaining redress.
The French courts are of two kinds; ordinary courts, which decide
questions of private law alone, and administrative courts, which
decide questions of public law. These latter courts are composed
chiefly of administrative officials, who are dependent legally and practically upon the ministers of the national government for their tenure
of office, and look upon disputes brought before them from a governmental point of view, with decisions following the course of good
policy. Cases concerning governmenital liability are held to be
exclusively within their jurisdiction. It is thus seen that although
the individual has a much broader field of suit than under our law,
the government exercises a check which would be impossible under
our theory of separation of powers.
Under the French law the injured person can only proceed against
the state when the act is done in good faith for the public 5interest,
whether within or beyond the legal authority of the official, and the
grounds for jurisdiction in the administrative courts afford a strong
probability of a verdict for the plaintiff. In our jurisdictions recourse
for damages can only be had against the officer himself; good faith
and public interest are no defense to such an officer, and whether the
is usually the
act in question was within his technical legal authority
test of his liability in case of a ministerial act.6
From the viewpoint of the injured individual it is hard to say which
system is better. Although by our law public interest is no defense to
an officer, the restriction of the suit to the officer makes an unsatisfactory recovery probable because of his financial irresponsibility.
By French law the victim may look to a responsible source for his
damages, but the defendant has the means of controlling indirectly
any excess of such damages, and may exercise its views of policy as
to a judgment. Such power is rarely exercised unjustly, and this
view would seem to lead to a fairer assumption of the damage. Such
a theory, of course, would be impossible under our system of judicature. Both systems are solicitous of the governmental administrative
agencies. It is submitted that it would be better policy to allow the
public, through its corporate person, to compensate for the fault of
its servants, rather than to compel the person injured by such fault to
be barred from a just recovery by the public's immunity through a
monarchical fiction of law. An indirect method of making the damage payable by the public through the federal government has been
adopted to some extent, for the government is allowed to indemnify
4

Lowell, The Governments of France, Italy and Germany, p. 60.
sSupra, note 4.
6ig R. C. L. 924; there is a line of authority to the contrary, ibid.
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its officers for liability which they may incur in the bonafide discharge
of their duties, and may raise money for that purpose.7 A similar
method has obtained in New York. 8 Likewise the national government has practically departed from the theory that the sovereign
cannot be sued in the matter of contracts by the establishment and
development of the Court of Claims.' Such changes show the tendency toward the assumption of the liability where it really belongs.
A solution of the problem in regard to the right of the plaintiff to
recover when himself a servant of the municipal corporation might
well lie in the election by the corporations to come under the Workmen's Compensation Acts of the various states. Sections 2o and 2i
of the Ohio Act provide that a municipal corporation is an employer.
By section 4 of the California Act, the municipal corporation may
elect to come under the act. Such provisions were undoubtedly made
with a view to the municipal liability in its private corporate capacity,
but they could well extend to its public governmental capacity. The
solution of the problem of recovery in regard to strangers will be
taken care of by the extension of the present legislative enactment.
L. W. Dawson, 'ip.

Constitutional Law: Validity of Homestead Exemption Law.In the recent case of Ruddy v.Rossi, 39 Sup. Ct. R. 46 (ipr8), the
proposition involved was whether Congress had power to preserve
homestead lands free from liability for previously contracted debts of
the owner after conveyance by the 'United States in fee simple. The
majority of the court sustained the power of Congress to act -inthis
manner, but Mr. Justice Holmes wrote a dissenting opinion. The gist
of his dissent was that when land has left the ownership and control
of the United States and has become merged with the territory of a
state, not different from any other privately owned property within
its jurisdiction, it is no longer subject to legislation on the part of the
United States. The opinion of the majority amounts, in his opinion,
to a destruction of the sovereign power of the state.
The Constitution (art. 4, sec. 3 cl. 2) declares, "The Congress shall
have power to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations
respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United
States." Acting under the authority thus granted, Congress passed
section 2296 of the Revised Statutes, the constitutionality of which is
impugned in the principal case. This Statute reads as follows: "No
lands acquired under the provision of this act shall in any event
become liable for the satisfaction of any debt or debts contracted prior
to the issuing of the patent therefor."
The validity of section 2296 has never before been attacked in the
United States Supreme Court, but the state courts have in a long line
of decisions, almost without discussion, affirmed the power of Congress
7

Mechem, Public Offices and Officers, sec. 879; Tracy v. Swartout, IOPeters

(U. S.) 80 (1836).
N.Y. L. 1883, c. 205.

9io Stat. at Large 612;

12

Stat. at Large 765.
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there exercised.' The Supreme Court cases are, however, full of
expressions as to the power of Congress to make all needful rules and
regulations. Thus, in United States v. -ratiot,it was said that the
United States has plenary power in the disposition of public lands;
and in a later case it is said, "With respect to the public domain, the
Constitution vests in Congress the power of disposition and of making
all needful rules and regulations. That power is subject to no limitations. Congress has the absolute right to prescribe the times, the
conditions and the mode of transferring this property, or any part of
it. * * * No state legislation can interfere with this right or
embarrass its exercise."I
Perhaps the strongest argument made on behalf of the unconstitutionality of this section is that, in dealing with so grave a matter
as that of depriving a state of a portion of its sovereign power, we
ought not to proceed unless we are authorized to do so expressly by
the words of the Constitution, or by a reasonable implication therefrom. Following this line of argument, it is said that, in conferring
upon Congress the power to make all needful rules and regulations
concerning the disposition of the public domains, it was simply intended
to give Congress the power of fixing the price to be paid for the land,
the method of entry, of gaining priority, etc., and that any attempt
by Congress to restrict the ordinary sovereign powers of the state after
the land has been transferred to private ownership is unwarranted.
It may be answered that Congress must have already possessed the
ordinary powers incident to the disposal of the public domains, and
it is not to be supposed that the framers of the Constitution would
have inserted an unnecessary and superfluous provision of this sort.
The far-sighted scope of policy and breadth of comprehension
revealed in the rest of the document negative any such inference.
What then was the intention? The United States was at this time
possessed of large tracts of land, practically all of it virgin in character.
A speedy clearing and cultivation of these lands would, of course, be
highly conducive to the prosperity of the country. But pioneer work
of this character was fraught with great hazards and difficulties. It
was scarcely the sort of a venture that would appeal to the propertied
or monied men. For the development of these lands reliance had
rather to be placed upon men who had been unsuccessful and were
willing, therefore, to expose themselves to hardships in order to obtain
a fresh start in life. Bit even a man of this sort would hardly be
willing to court danger unless given assurance that the fruits of his
labor would not be swept away for debts previously incurred. It
was with this situation in mind that the constitutional authorization,
here considered, may fairly be deemed to have been framed. In order
therefore, to encourage the development of these lands and to permit
improvident debtors to start anew in life, Congress, following an
enlightened and humane policy, has exempted them from debts
'Miller v. Little, 47 Cal. 348 (1874); Patton v. Richmond, 28 La. Ann. 795
(1876); Dickersonv. Bridges, 147 Mo. 235 (1898); Baldwinv. Boyd, 18 Neb. 444
(1885); Jackett v. Bower, 62 Neb. 232 (igoi); Ritzville Hardware Co. v. Bennington, 50 Wash. iii (i9o8).
States v. Gratiot, 14 Pet. (U. S.) 526 (1840).
IUnited
3
Gibson v. Chouteau, 13 Wall. (U. S.) 92, 99 (1871).
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contracted prior to the issuance of letters patent. "To deny to
Congres the power to make a valid and effective contract of this sort
with the homestead claimants would materially abridge its power of
disposal and seriously interfere with a favorite policy of government
which fosters measures tending ' to
4 a distribution of the lands to
actual settlers at a nominal price.
To prevent a possibility of any attempted interference with the
right vested in Congress of the disposal of the public domains, in
accordance with its discretion, a provision has been inserted in the
compacts by which new states have been admitted into the Union
that such interference with the right of primary disposal of the United
States shall not be made. Such provisions must be considered as a
solemn reaffirmation and recognition of the right vested in Congress
by the Constitution. An unlimited power over'the public lands has
been considered the foundation upon which the territorial governments rest.'

If the considerations last suggested are true the assertion that

Congress is violating the sovereignty of the state is met by the answer
that the state to this extent has already divested itself of its sovereignty by the express grant of power to the Congress of the United
States contained in article four, quoted above, and in the tenth
amendment to the Federal Constitution,6 and by reaffirming7 the right
in the compact by which it was admitted into the Union.
Mr. Justice Holmes, in his dissent, says that when public lands have
passed from the control of the United States and become identified
with the state lands, Congress loses all power of control and that the
land is subject thenceforth to state regulation. It must be conceded
that Congress cannot, after the issuance of letters patent, attach, as
an afterthought, new conditions or grant new exemptions. It is,
however, respectfully submitted that Mr. Justice Holmes has apparently overlooked the real crux of the problem which is that, while the
lands are still a portion of the public domains, Congress may, by
virtue of its power of primary disposal, annex any conditions or terms
to its grant, and, as against the state, the annexation of such conditions is a valid exercise of its power.
The' homestead exemption laws have given a tremendous impetus
to the rapid development of lands located within the bounds of most
of the western and mid-western states. It comes, therefore, with ill
grace on their part to contest the validity of said laws.
In this connection, it is worth while pointing out a distinction which
is being drawti by some of the couits and which, apparently, has no
foundation either in legal principle or in the Constitution. These
courts say that it is constitutional to grant an exemption from debts
contracted prior to the issuance of letters patent, but intimate that
Congress woald be overstepping the limits of its power if it attempted
to create an exemption from debts contracted after the issuance of
4Sorrels v. Self, 43 Ark. 451, 454 (1884).
5
Bagnell v. Broderick, 13 Pet. (U. S.) 436 (1839).
G"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the
people."
7
Russell v. Lowth, 21 Minn. 167 (1874).
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letters patent. 8 Granted that the method of disposing of the public
domains rests within the discretion of Congress, it must follow, as a
logical consequence, that the courts cannot draw a dividing line and
say to Congress, "You can go thus far and no further." For by so
doing, the courts would be substituting their own discretion as pre9
ferable to that of Congress. Clearly this cannot be done. As
of its
the
exercise
in
might,
Congress
case,
principal
suggested in the
sound discretion, have so disposed of the public lands as to practically
protect them from all indebtedness.
A. L. Sherry. 'g.
Contracts: Right of beneficiary to sue: New York doctrine.Seaver v. Ransom, 224 N. Y. 233 (19z8), raises again the much vexed
and disputed question in this state, of the right of a beneficiary to sue
on a contract to which he is not a party. The facts were that Mrs. B.
when about to die, had her husband, a lawyer, draw up her will
according to her instructions. She named her husband as residuary
legatee. When the will was read to her she said she wanted it
changed in order to leave her house to the plaintiff, her niece. Her
strength was waning fast "andalthough B offered to write another will
for her she was afraid that she would not live long enough to execute it.
B then said that if she would sign the will he had already drawn up, he
would leave the plaintiff enough in his will to make up the difference.
His wife then executed the will. When B died it was found that his
will made no provision for the niece. She therefore brought this
action against B's executor for the enforcement of B's contract with
his wife. The defendant denied the plaintiff's right to this action.
The court r6ecognized the difficulties which have existed with regard to
this question ever since the case of Lawrence v. Fox was decided,' the
court saying that "In New York the right of the beneficiary to sue on
contracts made for his benefit is not clearly or simply defined." After
a survey of the course of the doctrine in New York, the court, by a
bare majority, Pound, J., writing the prevailing opinion, sustained the
plaintiff's right to the action.
The general rule, both in law and equity, has been, of course, that
there must be privity between plaintiff and defendant to permit an
action on the contract. To this principle England firmly adheres and
refuses to recognize any exception. 2 In this country however, the
reverse is true, and most states permit an action on a contract to be
maintained by the direct beneficiary thereof. 3 It is curious that in
the state where the well known and influential case of Lawrence v.
FoX, 4 was adjudicated, the law on this subject has been in a rather
dubious condition. 5 The reason for this has been that while one case
is said to rest upon "the broad principle that if one person makes a
8

Sorrels v. Self, supra, note 4.
gGile v. Hallock, 33 Wis. 523 (1873).
12o N. Y. 268 (1859).

27 Halsbury's Laws of Eng. sec. 705; Jenk's Digest of Eng. Civil Law, sec. 229.
3
Lehow
4

v. Simonton, 3 Colo. 346 (877).
Supra, note 1.
sWilliston's Wald's Pollock on Contracts (3d. Amer. ed.) p. 250.
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promise to another for the benefit of a third person, that third person
may maintain an action on the promise,"' a subsequent case will
hold that its predecessor "should be limited to the same essential
facts" and its "doctrine not be extended to new and doubtful cases." 8
The result of this alternate enunciation of broad principle and narrow
doctrine has created uncertainty as to just what are the rights of the
beneficiary in New York.
As the principal case points out, an analysis of the cases in which
the question of the right of a beneficiary to maintain an action on the
contract is involved, discloses four distinct groups. The first group
raises no problem. Where B in return for a consideration moving
from A makes his promise directly to C, the rule is universal in this
country,9 that C may maintain an action on the contract. 0 The
difficulties arise only when C is an entire stranger to the contract.
The second group may be called the "donee baneficiary" cases. In
this type, A desiring to make a gift to C, enters into a contract with B,
whereby B promises to A to do something for C's benefit. May C
maintain an action on B's promise to A? As to such cases, of which
the principal case is an example, there has been doubt. The third
group is comprised of the "obligee beneficiary" cases. A is under
some pecuniary obligation to C, and desiring to relieve himself of it,
enters into a contract with B, as a result of which B promises to A to
assume a contractual duty in respect of such obligation. It is
settled that C may maintain an action on B's promise to A. The
fourth group comprises the public contract cases. If the municipality of A enters into a contract with B for the benefit of its
inhabitants, may C, an inhabitant, maintain an action on B's promise
to the municipality? It is now settled that he may if it is clear that
the contract was intended for his benefit."
The first reported case in New York, in which the question of the
right of a beneficiary to sue was presented was Schermerhorn v.
Vanderheyden," a "donee beneficiary" case. The defendant promised
to the plaintiff's father that he would give a certain desk to the
plaintiff, and upon his failure to perform the plaintiff sued the
promisor. The court permitted the action, holding, that "where one
person makes a promise to another for the benefit of a third person
that third person may maintain an action on such a promise." As
6

Burr v. Beers, 24 N. Y. -8ir
(I861).
7Lorillard v. Clyde, 122 N. Y. 498, 502 (189o).
sDavis v. Morris, 36 N. Y. 569, 575 (1867).
9

England contra; Leake, The Law of Contracts (6th ed.) p. 439, 440, 296.
"0Rector v. Teed, 12o N. Y. 583 (189o); accord, Farley v. Cleveland, 4 Cow.
(N. Y.) 432 (1825); Gold v. Phillips, io Johns. (N. Y.) 412 (1813); Bell v. Sappington, il1 Ga. 391 (i9oo); Williainson v. Yager, 91 Ky. 282 (1891); Cabot v.
Haskins, 3 Pick. (Mass.) 83 (1825); Van Eman v. Stanchfield, io Minn. 197
(1865).
"Contracts between a municipal corporation and a water company for an adequate water supply for the extinguishment of fires are held, in New York, not to
be for the direct benefit of the corporation inhabitants. Wainwright v. Queens
County Water Co., 78 Hun (N. Y.) 146 (T894); Smith v. Great South Bay Water
Co., 82 App. Div. (N. Y.) 427 (1903); accord, German Alliance Insurance Co. v.
Home Water Supply Co., 226 U. S. 220 (1912).
L21Johns. (N. Y.) 139 (I806).
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authority the court cited the early English case of Dutton v. Poole"
where similarly a father had obtained a promise for his daughter's
benefit. The essential point of these cases is that the promise was
made to a parent for the benefit of his child, that is, the person for
whose benefit the promise was made and who was seeking to enforce
it bore a close relationship to the promisee. It is this characteristic
upon which the New York courts later seized as distinguishing this
case and limiting its application. In other words, in the donee
beneficiary case, the beneficiary might maintain the action only if he
could show a close family relationship to the promisee. In Buchanan
v. Tilden'4 the relation of husband and wife, and in Todd v. Weber 5
that of illegitimate daughter and father were held sufficient. Ten
years later, however, the relationship of grandparent and grandchild
was held insufficient,"6 and shortly after that, in a clear cut case of
intent by the promisee to provide for her grandniece after her death,
that relationship was declared too distant to support the action."
It is to be noted, therefore, that prior to Seaver v. Ransom, the principal case, the right of the beneficiary to maintain the action in this
class of cases was permitted only-in case of husband and wife, and
parent and child.
The second group of cases and probably the most common is that
of the "obligee beneficiary" type. This class of cases may well be
distinguished from the preceding as a matter of principle. In the
"donee beneficiary" cases, there is no doubt that the promisee desires
and intends to benefit the beneficiary, and that the contract is made
for that purpose. In the "obligee beneficiary" case however, it may
be asked, is the promisee really making this contract for the benefit
of anyone but himself? When a debtor contracts that another shall
pay his debt can it reasonably be said the contract is altruistic, or is he
seeking nothing more than to relieve himself of a liability? This
latter is undoubtedly the actual situation.
Before considering the "obligee beneficiary" cases it should be noted
that there are two kinds of cases within this group which, while
similar in principle yet have a different historical origin. The first
is the mortgage case. A borrows from C on a mortgage and deeds his
land to B with the covenant that B shall assume the mortgage. May
C sue B? The second is the simple debt case. A owes C and in
return for some consideration B promises A to pay this debt. May C

sue B?

Before Lawrence v. Fox'8 in 1859, there had been no case before the
Court of Appeals of the simple debt type while there had been several
mortgage cases in equity before the chancellor, and in those cases the
mortgagee was permitted to maintain the action on the equitable doc1'i Ventr. (Eng.) 318 (1677); overruled Tweddle v. Atkinson, i B. & S. (Eng.)
(I86I).
111x8 N. Y. io9 (1899); accord Shepard v. Shepard, 7 Johns. Ch. (N. Y.) 57
(1823).
195 N. Y. 181 (x884).
In this case the court did not discuss the relationship
principle and asserted the broad doctrine that any direct beneficiary may sue,
citing
16 as authorities not only donee beneficiary cases but mortgage and debt cases.
Townsend v. Rackham, 143 N. Y. 516 (1894).
392

17Sullivan
v. Sullivan, 16I N. Y. 554 (1900).
18
Supra,note i.
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trine of subrogation. To quote from Halsey v. Reed 9 (subsequently
approved in King v. Whitely 0 ) "the principle * * * is that in
equity the creditor is entitled to the benefit of all collateral obligations
for the payment of the debt." But this statement applied only where
the mortgagor had given his bond with the mortgage and there was
consequently a personal obligation. If the obligation was represented
by merely the mortgage lien there was no debt to which the creditor
could be subrogated and he failed.2
The question of the right of any beneficiary to sue, not in equity,
but at law, on the contract for his benefit, was not discussed fully by
the court of last resort until the frequently and widely cited case of
Lawrence v. Fox was decided. On its facts this was a simple debt
case. One Hollis owed a debt to Lawrence. He lent a like sum to
Fox in return for which Fox promised to Hollis alone, to pay the debt
to Lawrence. The action is on that promise of Fox to Hollis. The
court pointed out that there had been previous debt cases yet in each
of them a promise direct to the beneficiary existed.2' Here for the
first time, the court says, the issue is presented, can the plaintiff sue
on the promise made solely to the promisee from whom the consideration proceeded. In answer the court quotes Schermerhorn v. Vanderheyden (supra),a relationshipcase, " 'whereone person makes a promise
to another for the benefit of the third person, that third person may
maintain an action upon it' has often been reasserted by our courts
and never departed from." This sweeping statement in connection
with the authority which the court cites for it, namely a relationship
case (Schermerhorn v. Vanderheyden) and a debt case in which the
promise ran directly to the plaintiff (Farley v. Cleveland") would
appear to indicate clearly that the intent of the court was once for all
to establish the principle, as the court further states, that in case of
'"a promise made to one for the benefit of another, he for whose benefit it
4
is made may bring an actionfor its breach."'
2'
Two years later, in Burr v. Beers, where the grantee had personally
199 Paiges Ch. (N. Y.) 445, 452 (1842).

2010 Paiges Ch. (N. Y.) 465,468 (1842); accord, Blyer v. Monholland, 2 Sandf.
Ch. (N. Y.) 478 (1845)
nThis is the principle which Professor Williston thinks, should control all
obligee cases, whether mortgage or simple debt. "The creditor is not wholly
without interest in the promise to pay his claim. That promise is a valuable right
belonging to his debtor. . . . It is as real an increase of the assets of the promisee as . . . the actual payment thereof. It should make no difference what
form a debtor's assets take. The law should be able to reach them in whatever
shape they may be and compel their application to the payment of debts. Williston's
2 Wald's Pollock on Contracts (3d. Amer. ed.) p. 245.
Farley v. Cleveland, supra, note 1o; Barker v. Bucklin, 2 Denio (N. Y.) 45,
53 (1846); D. & H. Canal Co. v. Westchester County Bank, 4 Denio (N. Y.) 9 7
(1847); cf. also Gold v. Phillips, supra, note Io; and dictum by Ch. Kent in
Cumberlandv. Codrington, 3 Johns. Ch. (N.Y.) 229,254 (x87). Notein Halsey
v. Reed, supra,note 19, the foreshadowing of Lawrence v. Fox. "It is not necessary to inquire whether the holder of the bond and mortgage could have maintained an action at law. . . within the principle of the decisions in Dutton v.
Poole
and Schermerhorn v. Vanderheyden."
23
24
Supra, note io.
Italics are the writer's.
5
Supra, note 6; Garnsey v. Rogers, 47 N. Y. 223 (1872), distinguishing Burr v.
Beers, says the deed to the grantee recited that the purchase price was reduced by
the amount of the mortgage, so Burr v. Beers can be supported on the ground of
money of plaintiff's in the hands of the defendant.
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assumed the bond and mortgage, the mortgagee did not foreclose his
mortgage and then sue the grantee for the deficiency, but sued the
grantee upon the bond, on default in payments. "If the judgment
can be supported at all," said the court, "it must be on the broad
principle that if one person makes a promise to another for the benefit
of a third person, that third person may maintain an action on the
promise. We must therefore regard the point as definitely settled so
far as the courts of this state are concerned," and the action was
allowed.
But the point was far from settled for unfortunately both these
cases were of the "obligee beneficiary" type and as new cases arose
the courts found some basis of distinction. 8 Finally, in Vrooman v.
Turner2 l definite limits were stated to the doctrine of Lawrence v. Fox,
" * * * there must be first an intent by the promisee to secure
some benefit to the third party, and second, some privity between the
two, * * * and [third] some obligation or duty owing from the
former to the latter which would give him a legal or equitable claim to
the benefit of the promise. * * * The courts are not inclined to
extend the doctrine of Lawrence v. Fox to cases not clearly within the
principles of that decision." Taking that statement in connection
with the denial of the court in Townsend v. Rackham,3 (a donee beneficiary case) that Lawrence v. Fox applied to any other cases than those
where the promisee was under legal-duty to the third person, we have
the limits of Lawrence v. Fox defined. The first requirement of
intent to benefit, as pointed out above, possesses little merit, while
the other two together mean that the doctrine of Lawrence v. Fox is
to be applied only where a legal obligation runs from the promisee to
the beneficiary.
The last group of cases, the public contract type, historically has.
its origin in the field of tort rather than contract. In Robinson v.
2A
second mortgagee covenanting to pay the first one is not liable to the first
mortgagee. Garnsey v. Rogers, supra,note 25. The assignees of a creditor have
no right of action. The rights of the creditor against the promisor being derived
from the debtor, are therefore not assignable. Barlow v. Myers, 64 N. Y. 41
(1876); Dunning v. Leavitt, 85 N. Y. 30 (18); Wheat v. Rice, 97 N. Y. 296,
302 (884).
The payee of a note could not maintain an action against a bank
with whom the money to meet the note had been deposited with instructions
to pay it. Aetna Nat'l. Bank v. Fourth Nat'l. Bank, 46 N. Y. 82 (1871).
2769 N. Y. 280, 284 (1877). In this case the mortgagee of the land was suing
the owner for the deficiency after foreclosure sale. The previous owner had not
agreed with the original grantee to assume the obligation of the mortgage; i. e.
there was no personal obligation upon him. In his conveyance to the defendant,
however there was a covenant by Turner to assume and pay off the mortgage in
return for which the purchase price was reduced. Plaintiff brought this action
on this promise. The court held that there was no personal obligation on the
grantor and therefore none on the grantee. The liability of the grantee depended
upon the equitable doctrine of subrogation which could be effective only where
there was such personal liability. The authority which the court cites for its
conclusion is King v. Whitely, supra,note 20, which it holds as exactly analogous.
But previously in Thorp v. Keokuk Coal Co., 48 N. Y. 253 (1872), the court on
almost similar facts in discussing King v. Whitely and the subrogation theory,
expressly declared that this doctrine was entirely unnecessary to permit recovery
by the mortgagee because of the broad rule laid down in Burr v. Beers, supra,
note 6

28143 N. Y. 516,

supra,note 14.
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Chamberlain,29 the defendant had contracted with the state to manage
and maintain in repair a certain portion of the state canal and locks, in
return for which he was privileged to charge tolls. He neglected this
duty of repair to the consequent injury of the plaintiff who brought
action for damages. The contractor was held liable, because of his
negligent performance of a duty he had undertaken. "The contract
[with the state] is deemed to inure to the benefit of every individual
interested in its performance." The idea in the mind of the court
apparently was the analogy of a tort action for breach of statutory
duty.
This was followed by a series of cases adopting the tort theory as the
basis for granting relief to the injured party,30 though in Coster v. The
Mayor of the City of Albany3 it was stated that Lawrence v. Fox,
Schermerhorn v. Vanderheyden and other contract beneficiary cases
were controlling in this class of cases. The decision, however, went
against the plaintiff on other grounds and it was not until the public
contract case of Little v. Banksn that this doctrine'of the right of the
beneficiary to sue upon the contract was made the ground of decision.
In that case the plaintiff beneficiary's right to an action on the contract
was sustained first, under the doctrine of Lawrence v. Fox and Coster v.
The Mayor, supra, and secondly, under the tort theory of Robinson v.
Chamberlain,supra. Thus the two principles united and the question
was which path subsequent public contract cases would take. The
course adopted was to follow the contract theory entirely. In the
case of Pond v. The New Rochelle Water Co." an inhabitant of the
village sued the company to prevent it from charging rates in excess of
that agreed in its contract with the municipal corporation. The
court held that this contract was for the benefit of the inhabitants
and that any one of them could sue on the contract upon the authority
of Lawrence v. Fox, and cited also other beneficiary cases both of the
obligee and donee type. The tort precedents were not mentioned.
In other words, the court clearly manifested a distinct desire to
abandon the limitation that had been created about the doctrine of
Lawrence v. Fox and once more lay down the general rule as had been
stated in that case, and in Todd v. Weber, supra.
The court, however, in subsequent decisions, refused to avail itself
of this opportunity to expand the rule and free it from its restraints,
but reverted once more to the policy of limitation, seeking to find a
justification for these public contract cases in some obligation afbalogous to the legal obligation required by the rule of Vroomanv. Turner,
supra. This they found in a "moral obligation." It is "morally
obligatory upon the city to secure the abutting owners from loss or
damage occasioned by negligence," said Cullen, J., in Smyth v. City
of New York,34 and in Rigney.v. New York Central & Hudson R. R. R.
N. Y. 389 (1866).
"Fulton Fire Ins. Co. v. Baldwin, 37 N. Y. 648 (1868); Johnson v. Belden, 47
N. Y. 130 (1871); McMahon v. Second Ave. R y. Co., 75 N. Y. 231 (1878).
3143 N. Y. 399, 411 (1871).
3285 N. Y. 258, 263 (i88).
uI83 N. Y. 330 (906); seenote ii.
32o3 N. Y. io6 (I91i)
a builder of the subway for the city agreed with the city
to assume liability for damages occasioned by his negligence.
2934
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Co., 35 the court expressly declared the decision within the limitations
of Vroo'man v. Turner because "the city is under some obligation to
protect its inhabitants."
The problem which the principle case presents is, to what extent
has it gone in enlarging and establishing the broad doctrine that any
beneficiary may maintain an action on the contract to which he is
not a party? It is submitted that the history of the doctrine of
Lawrence v. Fox has, since its enunciation, been one of limitation and
restriction, crystallized into a set rule in Vrooman v. Turner and followed thereafter by all obligee cases, 86 with a distinct tendency on the
part of the court to bring even the public contract cases within its
limitation. The court in the principal case points out that if the
plaintiff had been a son and not a niece, it would have been an ordinary donee beneficiary case. "The desire of the childless aunt to make
provisions for a beloved and favorite niece differs imperceptibly in
law or in equity from the moral duty of the parent. * * * No
sensible theory of moral obligation denies arbitrarily to the former
what would be conceded to the latter." Is this "moral duty" the
basis upon which subsequent decisions are to interpret this case, or
has the principal case done something more than merely to extend the
"donee beneficiary" group to include the relationship of aunt and
niece? Upon its facts it is a relationship case. Three of the seven
judges dissented. It is possible, therefore, that this case may in the
future meet the same fate as the attempts of Lawrence v. Fox and
Pond v.New Rochelle Water Co.,supra,to establish the broad doctrine
that any direct beneficiary may sue.
Such a result would, however, be discordant with the manifest
intent and spirit of the entire opinion. Judge Pound points out that
the right of any beneficiary to sue on a contract made expressly for
his benefit is the prevailing rule in this country and quotes that "the
establishment of this doctrine has been gradual, and is a victory of
practical utility over theory, of equity overtechnical subtlety."3 7 The
inference as to the desirability of establishing this doctrine in New
York, is obvious.
After indicating the four groups of beneficiary cases as discussed in
this note, the court says, "It may be safely said that a general rule
sustaining recovery at the suit of the third party would include but
few classes of cases not included in these groups * * *." In other
words, were the general rule to be adopted and the limitations and
distinctions between group and group to be forgotten, the cases
affected by its application and not already within some class of
precedent would be insignificant in number and importance.
If a case like Sullivan v. Sullivan3 were to come before the court
5217 N. Y. 31, 38 (gi6); Farnsworth v. Boro Oil & Gas Co., 216 N. Y. 40, 48
(rgS); Matter of International Ry. Co. v. Rann, 224 N. Y. 83, 88 (i938), accord.
"The city owing or assuming to owe to its inhabitants * * * * the duty of
obtaining more favorable rates [of carfare on trolley lines] entered into an agreement
which they (the inhabitants) may enforce."
3
Lorrilard v. Clyde; Davis v. Morris, supra,notes 7 and 8; dicta in Baird v.
Erie R. R., 21o N. Y. 225, 234 (1914); Title Guarantee & Trust Co. v. Haven,

214
N. Y. 468, 478 (i915).
3
Brantly on Contracts, (2d. ed.) p. 253.
88
Supra, note 17.
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again, or if instead of a relative, the beneficiary were a dear friend,
what would be the decision? "The doctrine of Lawrence v. Fox,"'9
quotes the court with approval, "is progressive not retrograde. The
course of the late decisions is to enlarge, not to limit, the effect of that
case." The principal case on its facts has left the question still an
open one, but it has created the opportunity for the court to take the
final step in establishing the broad principle of the right of any
beneficiary to sue on the contract. It may reasonably be supposed
that when the question arises the present court will take that final
step and bring itself into unqualified agreement with rule of the
majority of jurisdictions which "accords the remedy to the party who,
in most instances, is chiefly interested to enforce the promise, and
avoids a multiplicity of suits. That' 4it should occasion injustice to
either party seems to us impossible.
Benjamin Pepper,'20.
Contracts: Statute of Frauds: Promise to answer for the debt,
default or miscarriage of another.--In a previous issue of THE
QUARTERLY' there was fully discussed the important question as to
when a promise by a third person to the creditor to pay the debt of
the debtor is within the Statute of Frauds. Though all phases of the
question were considered, particular attention was directed to a discussion of the rules of law applicable when the third person promises
the creditor to pay the debt of A, and the debt as A's debt also continues to exist. It was noted that there was uncertainty, almost confusion, in the law on this phase of the question, as laid down by the
decisions of the New York courts, due to the failure of the courts
carefully to analyze and follow authorities which, it was submitted,
clearly defined the law on the question. The Court of Appeals has
recently, in RichardsonPress v. Albright, 224 N. Y. 497 (1918), made
the law on this phase of the question absolutely clear and has reached
the result which was submitted in the previous issue of THE QUARTERLY to be the correct one. In the instant case a corporation, the
Oceanic Publishing Company, of which defendant was a large stockholder, was indebted to the plaintiff on an account, amounting to
$3000, which was past due. The plaintiff notified the Publishing
Company that some arrangement must be made for the systematic
payment of this account and that plaintiff would do no more publishing for the company unless the cash therefor was in evidence. The
defendant, who was in charge of the debtor corporation, met a
representative of the plaintiff to make some arrangement for the
payment of the account. Defendant stated that he could not be
expected to pay the whole account but made the following oral
promise to the plaintiff: "I will agree to pay you $15oo, in three
payments, $500 weekly. I will further agree to pay each issue hereafter in cash, before you send it out." In an action against the
defendant, it was held that his promise was unenforceable.
As pointed out in the previous issue of THE QUARTERLY, the promise,
"Seaver v. Ransom, i8o App. Div. (N. Y.) 734 (1917).
4

"Lehow v. Simonton, supra,note 3.

12 CORNELL LAw QUARTERLY 209.

NOTES AND COMMENT
to be within the statute, must be collateral to the primary debt which
continues to exist, and that the promise is not within the statute and,
therefore, need not be in writing if it is original. As further pointed
out, there are several instances where the new promise is original, by
virtue of the fact that there ceases to be or never was any primary
debt.
The serious question arises, however, when the promisor promises
the creditor to pay the debt of A and the debt as A's debt also continues to exist. Then under what circumstances will the promise be
original and under what circumstances will it be collateral? To
briefly outline the history of the law on this point, it was at first held
that a promise to pay the debt of another was always collateral whenever the primary debt continued to exist. Then it came to be the
rule that where the primary debt continued to exist, the new promise
was original if "it was founded on a new or further consideration of
benefit or harm moving between the promisor and the creditorpromisee." 2 This rule, clearly too broad, was later narrowed by
Mallory v. GilletP which held that the "new consideration" should
move to the promisor and be beneficial to him. Thus a promise could
not be original if the new consideration was merely a detriment to the
promisee. This rule was in turn further limited and restricted by
Brown v. Webe& which held that to make a promise original where the
primary debt continued to exist there must be shown a new consideration moving to and beneficial to the promisor, as required by the
earlier cases, but that a further inquiry remained, whether such
promise was independent of the original debt or contingent upon it.
In White v. Rintoul- this rule was recognized as the law and Finch, J.,
writing for the court, declared that the earlier cases above mentioned
had ended in establishing the following doctrine: "Where the
primary debt subsists and was antecedently contracted, the promise
to pay is original when it is founded on a new consideration moving to
the promisor and beneficial to him, and such that the promisor thereby
comes under an independent
duty of payment irrespective of the liability
'6
of the principal debtor.

In the previous issue of THE

QUARTERLY

it was submitted that this

doctrine was to be construed as holding that to stamp as original a
promise to pay the debt of another where the primary debt continues
to exist, there must be two factors, viz., (a) a new consideration moving to the promisor and beneficial to him, and (b) an absolute and
independent promise to pay, and not merely to pay if the debtor does
not, i. e., the promise must be such that it can clearly be interpreted
as "I will pay you," and does not amount to "I will pay you if he
does not." Many cases have failed to demand, while many others
have demanded,7 the presence of the second feature which makes the
promise original, i. e., the promise in the form "I will pay you," and
2

Leonard v. Vredenburgh, 8 Johns (N. Y.) 29 (181I).
Y. 412 (186o).

32I N.
438 N.

Y.

187 (I868).

5io8
N. Y. 222 (1888).
6
ltalics are writer's.
7

See cases cited in 2 CORNELL LAw QUARTERLY 209, 213, notes 14, 15 and 16.
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thus the doctrine of White v. Rintoul lost much of its true meaning
and strength and the cases on the question became conflicting.
But the principal case, relying on White v. Rintoul, has clearly and
definitely decided that when the primary debt continues to exist, the
new promise can be original only if both of the two features above
mentioned are shown to be present. The court, per Pound, J., said:
"But a promisemay still be collateral, even though the new consideration moves to the promisor and is beneficial to him. The elements of
beneficial interest and new consideration must be present to take the
case out of the statute, but the inquiry remains whether the consideration is such that the promisor thereby comes under an independent
duty of payment, irrespective of the liability of the principal debtor."
The court in the principal case concluded that upon all the evidence
neither of the two necessary features were present and that therefore
the promise of the defendant was not original, but collateral, and
therefore unenforceable because it was not in writing. The court
intimates that the new consideration moving to the promisor must be
clearly, directly and not remotely beneficial to him. The court also
evidently demands that the second feature be clearly and unequivocally evidenced, and that the precise language used is not always
significant, but that it is the character of the obligation sought to be
assumed and the intention of the parties and the circumstances surrounding the transaction which are controlling. The court said:
"When the primary debt continues to exist, the promise of another
to pay the debt may be original, or it may not be, but it is regarded as
original only when the party sought to be charged clearly becomes,
within the intention of the parties, a principal debtor primarily liable.
If we pick a few phrases from the context, we may draw the conclusion
that defendant intended to assume such a relation to plaintiff; but on
all the evidence we find but one principal primary debtor, and that is
the Oceanic Publishing Company. The ancient purpose of the
statute of frauds was to require satisfactory evidence of a promise to
answer for the debt of another person, and its efficacy should not be
wasted by unsubstantial verbal distinctions."
Fred S. Reese, Jr., '.8.
Domestic Relations: Domicile of minor.-In Delaware, L. &' W.
R. R. Co. v. Petrowsky, 25o Fed. Rep. 554 (xPI8), the court passes on
the question of an infant's domicile. Petrowsky, a minor, brought
suit by his next friend in the Federal Court, relying on diversity of
citizenship. At the time of bringing the action he was a minor living
with his brother in New York, and his father was domiciled in Pennsylvania. At the time of the accident Petrowsky had his father's
domicile. Since defendant is a domestic corporation of the state of
Pennsylvania, if at the time of bringing suit this was still his domicile,
he would be excluded from the Federal Court. Petrowsky, however,
claims that he was emancipated by his father and that he now takes
the domicile of the brother with whom he lives. Without deciding
whether the instrument which the father executed effected an emancipation or an apprenticeship, or either, the court held that where a
parent surrenders the care and custody of his minor child to one
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who agrees to assume the parent's duty during the entire remaining
period of minority, as the parent did in this case, the child acquires
the domicile of the person who assumes this responsibility. As the
defendant's petition for writ of certiorariwas denied by the Supreme
Court,' the above must be considered the law of the case.
The father is the natural guardian of his minor legitimate child, and2
the domicile of the child is that of the father and changes with it.
The general rule is that a minor, being non sui juris, cannot change
his domicile. Nor is change effected by the removal of the infant
from his former domicile by an unauthorized person.3 A testamentary guardian, nominated by the father, may have the same control4
of the ward's domicile that the father had, if the mother is not living.
The case of Wood v. Wood' has been cited as holding that the parent
or guardian has the right to change the domicile of infant children or
wards from one state to another, but what that case really discusses is
residence, which is not the same as domicile. The expression is only
dictum, at any rate, and the rule generally is against permitting
change of domicile by appointed guardians.6 The Supreme Court of
the United States7 has held that only a natural or testamentary
guardian has the parental power to change domicile, and especially
that a guardian appointed by a Court in another state, in which the
minor is temporarily residing, has not the power. In that case the
court held that the questions for decision were, (i) whether the
children retained the domicile of their deceased father in Georgia, or
followed that of their mother on her re-marriage, or (2) whether they
acquired the domicile of their guardian appointed by a surrogate in
New York, while they were temporarily residing there with their
mother. The court held that the children kept the domicile of their
father (and of their mother during widowhood) in Georgia until they
went to live with their grandmother in the same state after their
mother's death, and that the grandmother being then the natural
guardian their domicile thereafter followed hers. Woodward v.
Woodward,8 commenting on Lamar v. Micou, 9 says, "This case goes
farther than we would feel at liberty to go, and we cite it merely as
instructive." It seems that courts are loath to relax the rules governing the domicile of minors.
Even if the instrument in the principal case is an emancipation of
the infant, it is not at all clear that the child would be free to fix his
own domicile,' 0 although it would seem logical that he be permitted to
do so. But the court in the principal case expressly refrains from
calling it an emancipation. It seems rather to be an agreement
between the parents and the brother for the transfer of parental duty
138 Sup. Ct. Rep. 427 (1918).

2

Herrick v. Richardson, 40 N. H. 272 (186o); White v. White,
(1913);
Story, Conflict of Laws, (8th ed.) see. 46.
3
Sudler v. Sudler, 121 Md. 46 (1913).
4White v. Howard, 52 Barb. (N. Y.) 294 (1868).

77 N. H.

15 Paige (N. Y.) 596 (1836).
GJacobs, Law of Domicile, sec. 26o.
7

Lamarv. Micou,

112 U. S. 452

(1884), affd. 114 U. S. 218 (1885).

88
Tenn. 644 (1889).
9 7
Supra,note 7.
0
' D. L. & W. R. R. Co. v. Petrowsky, 250 Fed. Rep. 554,!559; 29 Cyc. 1675.
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and custody to the latter, who by virtue of the indenture is made to
stand in loco parentis, thereby acquiring all the right of the parent
over the child, including the right to dominate the child's domicile.
A similar transaction, only verbal, occurred in the case of Allgood v.
Williams." The father, a few weeks before his death, said to his
brother: "Take my child and raise her right." The child was at
that time with the brother and remained with him, but it was held
that her domicile was that of her father at the time of his death, and
not her uncle's. The court said that generally a father cannot change
the child's domicile except by changing his own because "their legal
inseparability is essential to the efficiency of parental government, and
to the discharge of the duties which the father owes the child." In
the same case the court says that mere residence in a place for a special
or temporary purpose will not fix a domicile. In the principal case
there is some indication that the parties intended to work a change of
domicile with the view of enabling plaintiff to sue in the Federal
Court of the Southern District of New York. The court says, however, that motive is immaterial if there appears an absolute and fixed
intention to abandon one domicile and acquire another.
The principal case goes somewhat further than previous cases in
permitting a change of a minor's domicile during the life of the
parents without a corresponding change in their domicile. It is
possible to imagine very unfortunate applications of the rule. An
almost unlimited power is given the parent to select, from the states
of the Union, that state whose law is most favorable to the child in a
given situation, and transfer the child's domicile to that state.
Mary H. Donlon, '20.
Eminent Domain: Public use.-In the case of the Monetaire
Mining Co. v. Columbus Rexall Consolidated Mines Co., z74 Pac.
(Utah) Y72 (rg98), the plaintiff company, the owner of a mine containing gold, silver, and other precious metals, desired to condemn a right
of way through a tunnel built and owned by the defendant, another
mining company, for the purpose of working its mine to better
advantage. The evidence showed that the tunnel was not being used
to full capacity, and that it could easily handle the ores that viould
pass through it from both mines. The defendant contended that this
condemnation of a right of way through its own tunnel was a taking
of private property for private use. But the court, citing certain
Utah statutes,1 said that it was manifestly the intention of the state
legislature to grant the right of eminent domain for this purpose, and
held that, since the appropriation of property and the acquirement of
an easement therein for the purpose of developing the mineral
resources of the state are public uses, the use which the plaintiff
sought to acquire was a public use. It was also pointed out that,
since the plaintiff did not seek to dispossess the defendant, but merely
to condemn the unused capacity of the tunnel, and to work it in
common with the defendant, the statute prohibiting the condemna1192 Ala. 551 (189o).

'Comp. Laws Utah, T907, sec. 3588, as amended by ch. 47, L. 1909, p. 50.
Comp.
Laws Utah, 1907, sec 359 o , subdivs 3, 5, and 6.
2
Comp. Laws Utah, 1907, sec. 359o, subdiv. 3.
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tion of property already devoted to a public use except for a more
necessary public use was inapplicable.
Whether or not property may be taken in the exercise of the power
of eminent domain often depends on the meaning given to the phrase
"public use," for it is generally agreed that private property may not
be condemned for a private use. This is generally based on the "due
process" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, but sometimes also, on express or implied prohibitions in the
eminent domain provisions of the state constitutions, or even on the
ground that it would be contrary to the principles of free government,
or to the spirit of the constitution.3 Few of the state constitutions
contain express provisions prohibiting the taking of property by
eminent domain for private use.
Whether or not a use is public is, in the first instance, a question
for the legislature; but a declaration by the legislature that a use is
public does not necessarily make it so, and, though courts give great
a certain use is public, the
weight to a legislative declaration that
4
question is ultimately a judicial one.
The question as to whether a use is public is not affected by the
agency employed. The state itself may condemn the property, or it
may delegate the power to an individual or corporation.5 The fact
that the use to which property is going to be put is purely local or
limited does not affect the question of public use.8 "A school house
site for a district of a dozen families is as undeniably for public use as
the ground for a state house. ' 7 After it has once been determined
that a use is public, the legislature should be the body to determine
whether the condemnation of property for that use is expedient."
It is very difficult to define precisely the phrase "public use". 9 If
the phrase is taken to mean "use by the public," then it might seem
justifiable to condemn private property as a site for a hotel or theatre,
and it is well known that such establishments cannot exercise the
right of eminent domain, though they are bound to serve the public.' 0
3
Gillan v. Hutchinson, 16 Cal. I54 (I86O); Matter of Niagara Falls and Whirlpool Ry. Co., xo8 N. Y. 375 (1888); Lewis on Eminent Domain, sees. 250, 315;
on Eminent Domain, sees. 37, 39.
Nichols
4
New Central Coal Co. v. George's Creek Coal and Iron Co., 37 Md. 537 (1872);
Matter of Deansville Cemetery Ass'n., 66 N.Y. 569 (1876); Matter of Niagara
Falls and Whirlpool Ry. Co., supra, note 3; San Mateo County v. Coburn, 1.3o
Cal.
631 (I9OO).
5
State v. Rapp, 39 Minn. 65 (1888); Hand Gold Mining Co. v. Parker, 59 Ga.
419 (1877); Moran v. Ross, 79 Cal. 159 (1889).

'Matter of Burns,

155

N. Y. 23 (A898).

7Lewis on Eminent Domain, sec. 252. See also Williams v. School District,
33 Vt. 271 (186o).
sPeople v. Smith, 21 N. Y. 595 (1860). Some cases, however, hold that the
element of necessity should be considered in determining whether or not the use is
public. See RyerSon v. Brown, 35 Mich. 332 (1877); Jordan v. Woodward, 40
Me. 317, 323 (1855); Dayton Mining Co. v. Seawell, i Nev. 394 (1876).
gThe Connecticut court has said that it is incapable of precise definition,
v. Camp, 33 Conn. 532, 551 (1866).
Olnstead
10In Dayton Mining Co. v. Seawell, supra, note 8, the court, at pp. 41o and 411,.
says: "If public occupation and enjoyment of the object for which land is.
condemned furnishes the only and true test for the right of eminent domain, then
the legislature would certainly have the constitutional authority to condemn the
land of any private citizen for the purpose of building hotels and theatres. Why
not? A hotel is used by the public as much as a railroad. The public have the
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On the other hand, if "public use" means "public advantage, benefit,
or utility," the question for determination would seem to be whether
one use is more beneficial than another, as, for example, whether one
business was of more service to the community than another already
established in a given locality. Some courts have held that the true
definition of the phrase consists in a combination of these two meanings. According to the majority view it would seem that the following elements are necessary for the exercise of the power of eminent
domain: (i) the undertaking must be highly and directly useful to
the members of the community at large; (2) it must be entered upon
for the purpose of serving the members of the community at large;
and (3) the power must be ordinarily necessary to that kind of undertaking." When these elements are present, the courts will usually
consider the use public, as in the case of railroads and highways.
But there are three purposes which have been held in some jurisdictions to justify the exercise of the power, though the use is not directly
beneficial to the public, and though the property, far from being
devoted to the use of the public, comes as much under the direct
ownership and control of the petitioner as though he had acquired it
by ordinary purchase. These are (i) the reclamation of wet and arid
lands, 2 (2) the development and utilization of water power, and (3)
the development and use of our mineral resources. The remainder of
this note will be devoted to a brief consideration of the last two of
these classes.
Before the Revolution it had been the practice in the New England
states to condemn property for grist mill sites. These mills were
run by water power, and the right of eminent domain was exercised
both to acquire a site for the mill itself and the right to flow the land
of others by the erection of a dam. The use was at first a public one
in fact, since upon payment of a toll the mills had to grind for all
comers. After the Revolution, the practice was still persisted in,
even though there was no obligation on the part of the mill owner to
grind for everyone who paid the price, and the mill acts were held
constitutional almost simultaneously in two states, Massachusetts
same right, upon the payment of a fixed compensation, to seek rest and refreshment at a public inn as they have to travel upon a railroad. * * * Now, while
it may be admitted that hotels, theatres, stage coaches, and city hacks are a
means necessarily follow that the right
benefit to the public, it does not byinany
of eminent domain can be exercised their favor."
"Some of the cases which support this view are Albright v. Sussex County Lake
and Park Commission, 71 N. J. L. 303 (1904); Opinion of the justices, 204 Mass.
607 (191o); Lowell v. Boston, III Mass. 454 (1873); Matter of Niagara Falls
and Whirlpool Ry. Co., supra, note 3; State ex rel. Tacoma Industrial Co. v.
White River Power Co., 39 Wash. 648 (1905); Varner v. Martin, 21 W. Va. 534,
556 (1883); Fallsburg Power & Mfg. Co. v. Alexander, ioi Va. 98 (19o3); People
v. Salem, 20 Mich. 452, 48o (1870).
"Clark v. Nash, 19 8 U. S. 361 (19o5); Wurts v. Hoagland, 114 U. S. 6o6 (1885).
"Boston and Roxbury Mill Corporation v. Newman, 12 Pick. (Mass.) 467
Themillacts
(1832); Scudderv. Treiiton Del. Falls Co., i N. J. Eq. 694 (832).
are now justified in Massachusetts under the doctrine of the regulation of the
common interests of riparian owners, and are not considered to be an exercise of
the power of eminent domain at all; Otis Co. v. Ludlow Mfg. Co., 186 Mass. 89
(1904).
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and New Jersey." Other jurisdictions adopted this doctrine,14
though some of their courts have since thought that if the question
were a new one it would be decided against the constitutionality of
the legislation. 5 Several states have held similar mill acts unconstitutional. 6 It would seem that where a grist mill is not obliged to
grind for the public, and is not under public regulation, little can be
said in favor of the constitutionality of granting it the power of
eminent domain. In this age of steam, when water power is not
essential for the establishment of a mill, a grist mill would not seem to
be more of a public use than any other private business or enterprise.
The decisions upholding the constitutionality of the mill acts had
considerable effect on the mining law of some of the western states.
In 1875 the legislature of Nevada passed a statute declaring that
"the production and reduction of ores are of vital necessity to the
people of this state; are pursuits in which all are interested and from
which all derive a benefit; so the mining, milling, smelting, or other
reduction of ores are hereby declared to be for the public use, and the
right of eminent domain may be exercised therefor.'1 7 The constitutionality of this enactment was questioned in the case of the Dayton
Mining Co. v. Seawell.' 8 In that case the plaintiff desired to condemn
a strip of land in order to transport wood, timber, and other materials
necessary for the working of its mine. The land, after condemnation,
would become the private property of the plaintiff. The court, after
a careful review of the mill-dam cases, held that the use was public
and allowed the condemnation. The statute was, of course, upheld.
This decision was followed in a later Nevada case, 19 which held that
land might be condemned for a mining shaft. Similar legislation was
upheld in Utah in 1904.20

In Georgia it has been held that a gold

mining company may condemn a right of way for a ditch to conduct
water to its mine.2 Such laws have been held unconstitutional in
California," Pennsylvania," Washington, 4 and practically so in West
Virginia." In the California case, which held that a mining company
may not condemn a right of way for a flume to carry off the tailings
from the mine, the court said: "It is clear, from the averment of the
1401nstead v. Camp, supra, note 9; Harding v. Goodlett, 3 Yerg. (Tenn.) 41
Miller v. Troost, 14 Minn. 282 (1869); Hiarding v. Funk, 8 Kari. 315
(150c
o
. o Co. v. Sprague Co., 35 Conn. 496 (I868); Fisher v. Horicon Iron and

(18.32)

Manufacturing Co., I Wis. 293 (i86o).
"6Hay v. Cohoes Co., 3 Barb. (N. Y.) 42 (1848); Loughbridge v. Harris, 42 Ga.
500 (1871); Saddler v. Langham, 34 Ala. 311 (1859).
'7Nev. Stat. 1875, 111. Now, apparently, Rev. Laws Nev. (I912), sec. 56o6,
subdiv. 6.
"8Supra, note 8.
9Overman Silver Mining Co. v. Corcoran, i5 Nev. 147 (I88o).
20Highland Boy Mining Co. v. Strickley, 28 Utah 215 (904), aff'd. Strickley
v. Highland Boy Mining Co., 200 U. S. 527 (19o6). In this case the plaintiff was
allowed to condemn a right of way for an aerial bucket line across the mining claim
of defendant, to be used for carrying ores, for itself and others, from the mines to
the railroad station.
2Hand Gold Mining Co. v. Parker, supra, note 5.
nConsolidated Channel Co. v. Central Pacific Ry. Co., 5I Cal. 269 (1876).
nWaddell's Appeal, 84 Pa. 90 (1877).
"State v. Superior Court, 33 Wash. 542 (1903).
25Valley City Salt Co. v. Brown, 7 W. Va. 191 (1874).
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complaint, that the object sought is the appropriation of the private
property of the defendants to the private use of the plaintiffs. The
proposed flume is to be constructed solely for the purpose of advantageously and profitably washing and mining plaintiff's mining
ground. It is not even pretended that any person other than the
plaintiff will derive any benefit whatever from the structure when
completed. No public use can possibly be subserved by it. It is a
private enterprise to be conducted solely for the personal benefit of
the plaintiffs, and in which the community at large have no concern.
It is clear that this case does not come within the meaning of that
clause of the Constitution which permits the taking of private property
for a public use after just compensation made."
The principal case seems to be a rather extreme application of an
exceptional doctrine. When the courts grant a private mining
company the right to exercise the power of eminent domain, they are
allowing the condemnation of private property wholly on the ground
of great public benefit, though this benefit is indirect in character.
Though, under the Nevada and Utah rule, we might expect the condemnation of land for a mining shaft, or to gain access to a mine by
building a highway or railroad, we are somewhat surprised to discover
that one mining company can actually acquire by eminent domain a
right to use a tunnel constructed by its competitor.
Charles V. Parsell, Jr., '20
Pleading: When fraud is set up to avoid terms of a written contract: Effect of section 522 Code of Civil Procedure.-In Whipple v.
Brown Brothers Co., 225 N. Y. 237 (1919), plaintiff brought an action
for damages for breach of a contract of warranty. The answer denied
the warranty alleged and set out the true contract, a writing, which
was alleged to have been performed. No reply to the answer was
asked for, and none was served. After plaintiff had proved an oral
contract of warranty, defendant put in evidence a written contract of
different terms signed by the parties. To avoid the writing, plaintiff,
over objection, proved by parol evidence that the writing was obtained
by fraud without negligence on his part. By a division of four to
three the court held the evidence was properly admitted. The
majority held, that as there was fraud in the execution, or in faaum,
the writing was void, and where parol evidence is introduced not to
vary the terms of a written contract but to show that no contract ever
existed, such evidence is admissible. The minority held that since a
written contract induced by fraud as to a matter material to the
party defrauded is not void but voidable only, the complaint should
have contained appropriate allegations and a prayer for reformation.
Two theories of fraud regarding contract have been frequently
announced in New York and a number of other jurisdictions: (i)
fraud in execution and (2) fraud in procurement. If a signature is
obtained to a writing by misrepresentations as to its terms, and the
signing party is not negligent in failing to read the instrument,' or if
there has been a surreptitious substitution of papers at the time of
'Eldorado Jewelry Co. v. Danell, 135 Iowa 555 (I907); Vail v. Reynolds, ii
N. Y. 297 (i8go); Trambly v. Rickard, i3o Mass. 259 (188i).
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the signing,2 the contract is absolutely void and a suit to avoid it is
unnecessary. The reason is that the minds of the parties have not
met on the terms of the contract. This kind of fraud is generally
designated fraud in execution, or fraud in factum. If however, the
terms of the writing are fully understood and assented to, but the
contract was entered into in reliance upon some fraudulent misrepresentation as to the scope and effect of the contract, the authorities
agree that the contract is voidable only in a suit brought for that
purpose,3 and that parol evidence of the fraud or of the real terms of
the contract cannot be given in a suit to enforce the written contract
without appropriate pleadings upon which to base a rescission or
reformation.4 This kind of fraud is called fraud in procurement, or
in treaty.
Where there has been an oral agreement and the parties have
further stipulated that it be put in writing, and one of the parties in
writing the contract makes a material alteration from the terms orally
agreed upon, and by fraud secures a signature of the other party, the
defrauded party is discharged from the obligation of the writing and
may rely on the oral agreement.5 Assuming, however, the view of the
minority that the fraud in this case made the instrument voidable
only, and not void, there is some conflict of authority as to whether
in an action for damages he must first resort to a separate suit in
equity to reform the instrument to correspond to the oral agreement,
or whether the equitable relief of reformation and legal relief of
enforcement will be granted in the same action. In code' states
generally fraud in procurement may be set up in a civil action for
breach of the contract,6 but not in common-law 7jurisdictions where
the defrauded party must first proceed in equity.
It was the accepted principle at common-law that a defect in the
declaration might be supplied by an allegation in the replication, and
that the two pleadings might be read together in ascertaining whether
a cause of action was stated, and what that cause was." In Equity
there was no pleading after the answer or plea, 9 but defects in the bill
might be supplied by allegations in the answer.10 In the jurisdictions
which have adopted the reformed pleading the same principle has
been frequently applied. The complaint and reply may be read
together in ascertaining the nature of plaintiff's cause of action."
2

Wilcox v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 176 N. Y. i 15 (i9o3); Biddeford National Bank
v. 3Hill, 102 Me. 346 (907); Alexander v. Brogley, 63 N. J. L. 307 (7899).
Smith v. Ryan, 191 N. Y. 452 (19o8); Gould v. Cayuga County National
86 N. Y. 75 (1881).
Bank,
4
Welles v. Yates, 44 N. Y. 525 (7877).
5
Rounsavell v. Pease, 45 Wis. 506 (1878).

6

Albany City Savings Institution v. Burdick, 87 N. Y. 40 (i8gi); Coats v.
Camden Fire Ins. Ass., 149 Wis. 129 (1912); Maher v. Hibernia Ins. Co., 67 N. Y.
283 (1876); Pringle v. Hall, 6 Ariz. 284 (7899).
7Hartly v. C. & A. R. R. Co., 214 Ill. 78 (905); Eaton v. Eaton, 37 N. J. L.
io8 (1874); S. S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Vann, et al, 69 Fla. 544 (i915); Kosztelnik v.
Bethlehem
Iron Co., 91 Fed. 606 (1898).
8
Story, Pleadings in Civil Actions (2d. ed.), P. 55.
Equity
Pleadings, (9th ed.) sec. 848.
'Story,
"0Story, Equity Pleadings, (9th ed.) sec. 878.
nDeeves v. Metropolitan Realty Co. of City of N. Y.; 25 Civ. Proc. R. 276
(894); Sullivan v. The Trader's Ins. Co. of Chicago, 369 N. Y. 213 (1901);
Wiederman v. Verschleiser, 95 Misc. (N. Y.) 276 (1916).
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If the complaint shows groinds for legal relief and the reply shows
grounls for equitable relief also, although in order of procedure the
equity relief precedes the legal relief, both may be given in one action
under such pleadings. 12 If the legal relief i incidental to the equitable
relief a jury may be dispensed with, but if it is thought not to be
incidental the court may try the equitable issue and submit the legal
issue to a jury either at the same or different hearings.1 3
Section 516 of the New York Code of Civil Procedure provides that
where the answer sets out new matter the court may require a reply
thereto. Section 522 provides that if no reply is required the new
matter in the answer will be deemed to be denied or avoided as the
case may require. If defendant does not seek a reply under section
516 he cannot complain if plaintiff meets the new allegations by proof
in avoidance, The plaintiff has the benefit of a theoretical reply in
avoidance. Under codes abolishing the procedural distinctions
between actions at law and suits in equity, 4 it would seem immaterial
that this implied reply in avoidance be equitable in character. If
reformation is what is needed to permit a suit on a contract which the
answer says is in writing, and which plaintiff claims does not correctly
state the oral agreement, it would seem proper that the theoretical
reply should be considered to contain the appropriate allegations for a
reformation. If this works a surprise on defendant it is because he
has not availed himself of a privilege to be advised by asking for a
reply under Section 516.
Reformation and enforcement of the contract as reformed may be
had in one suit."5 It would seem, therefore, under codes like the New
York Code of Civil Procedure, that it would be immaterial in determining the admissibility of parol evidence to show the true contract,
whether the courts will permit the agreement in writing to be ignored,
or whether it will require a suit for reformation, when the answer
alleges that the contract was not oral but in writing, and sets out the
terms, and there is no reply. It should be admissible in the one case
to show that the minds of the parties did not meet on the terms of the
writing, and that the writing is therefore a nullity. It should be
admissible in the other case to show facts requiring reformation, which
are impliedly alleged in the reply.
It seems that the dissenting judge in the principal case dealt with
section 522 as though it provided for a denial only of the new matter in
the answer, and overlooked the fact that matter by way of avoidance
in the theoretical reply could be taken in conjunction with the complaint in determining plaintiff's cause of action.
Jacob Meadow, '2o.
"Sullivan v. The Trader's Ins. Co. of Chicago, supra, note ii.
"Sec. 973 N. Y Code of Civ. Proc. "The court in its discretion may order one
or more issues to be separately tried prior to any trial of the other issues in the
case."
4
N. Y. Code of Civ. Proc., see. 3339; Remington & Ballinger's Annotated
Codes and Statutes of Wash., sec. r53, Supplemental Supplement, Code of Iowa,
sec. 3426; Kerr's Cyc. Codes of Cal., sec. 307, etc.
"Pringle v. Hall, supra, note 6; Coats v. Camden Fire Ins. Ass., supra, note 6;
S. S. Fire Ins. Co. v. Vann, et al, supra, note 7; Imperial Shale Brick Co. v.
Jewett, 169 N. Y. 143 (igoi).
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Real Property: Effect of oil and gas lease.-In Pittsburg & W.
Va. Gas Co. v. Ankrom, 97 S. E. (W. Va.) 593 (19z8), the Supreme
Court of West Virginia was again confronted with the question as to
the manner of payment of royalties for an oil and gas lease covering
land owned by more than one lessor. Collins, the owner of a large
tract of land, had leased the same to the plaintiff for oil and gas purposes, reserving one-eighth of the oil produced as royalty. Subsequently, the land being divided into several subdivisions came into the
hands of different purchasers. A well was sunk on the division of one
Riggs, one of the purchasers, and he claimed the entire royalty on the
oil produced. The other purchasers contested his rights, on the
ground that the lease covered the entire tract of land, that therefore
the royalty should be divided among them proportionately. It was
held by a divided court that Riggs was entitled to the entire royalty,
i. e., that the owner of each subdivision is entitled to all the royalties
for the oil produced from his parcel of land. This decision is said in
one of the prevailing opinions, to overrule the previous case of Campbell v. Lynch,' in the same jurisdiction.
The American jurisdictions are in direct conflict on this question,
Ohio, Arkansas, and Indiana being in accord with Pittsburg&YW. Va.
Gas Co. v. Ankrom2 ; California, Pennsylvania, and the preceding West
Virginia decisions taking the opposite view. 3 In Fairbanks v. Warrum,4 the owner of two tracts of land executed an oil and gas lease
covering both. He sold the one tract and parcel of the other. A
well was drilled on the remaining portion of this latter tract, and
though the oil was partly drawn from the tracts conveyed, it was held
that the entire royalty belonged to the one on whose land the well was
drilled. The grantee acquired only a qualified ownership of the gas
under his land, subject to be defeated if it flowed beneath the surface
of the lands of another.6 Osborn v. Ark. Ter. Oil & Gas Co.6 was
decided the same way on similar facts. In the Ohio case, the facts
were almost identical with those of the principal case and there also7
the owner of the land developed was entitled to the entire royalties.
The cases relied upon by the dissent, both from West Virginia and
other jurisdictions 8 are, with one exception, not on all fours with
18I W. Va. 374 (1917).
According to Lynch, J., who wrote a concurring opinion
in the principal case, these cases can be reconciled. The main question in this
earlier case was whether partition of the land subject to an oil and gas lease affects
thepreviousstatusofthelandownersascoparceners in the royalty reserved. The
majority held it did not. .Therefre, the question as to the apportionment of rent.
as between separate and independent owners of land was not involved. Since
the partition did not affect the royalties, the owners were still in the position of
coparceners in that respect.
2
airbanks v. Warfre, 56 Ind. App. 337 (1914); Osborn v. Ark. Ter. Oil Co.,

103
1

Ark.

175 (1912);

N. W. Natural Gas Co. v. Ullery, 68 Ohio 259

(1903).

Higgins v. Cal. Pet. & Asphalt Co., io9 Cal. 304 (1895); Lyncl v. Davis, 79 W,
Va. 437 (1917); Campbell v. Lynch, supra, note i; Harness v. Eastern Oil Co.,
49 W. Va. 232 (1901); South Penn Oil Co. v. Snodgrass, 71 W. Va. 438 (1912);
Wettengel v. Gormley, i6o Pa. 559 (894).
4Supra, note 2.
6Richmond Natural Gas Co. v. Davenport, 37 Ind. App. 25 (i9o5); Rupel v.
Ohio Oil Co., 176 Ind. 4 (191x); Heller v. Dailey, 28 Ind. App. 555 (1902).
6
Supra, note 2.
'N. W. Natural Gas Co. v. Ullery, supra, note 2
8
California and Pennsylvania, supra, note 3.
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Pittsburg6&W. Va. Gas Co. v. Ankrom. Almost all of them are in the

nature of joint leases by separate owners. In Higgins v. Cal. Pet.
Co., 9 two adjoining landowners, for the purpose of mining, combined
their tracts and leased them as a single parcel. It was there held that
they made themselves tenants in common in such minerals and that,
though the mining is done exclusively in the land of one only, each
lessor has an equal interest in the royalty thus reserved. Ritz, J.,10
expresses the opinion that that is the effect in Lynch v. Davis," an
earlier West Virginia case, and the only effect which should be given
to the opinion in that case. Giving it this interpretation, it would
seem that Higgins v. Cal. Pet. Co.," Lynch v. Davis,"3 and the still
14

earlier West Virginia decisions may be distinguished from the final
decision in the principal case.
There still remains, however, the Pennsylvania case of Wettengel v.
Gormley,"-'which cannotbe soreconciled. Here the land in question was
subject to a lease as in the principal case when it came into the hands
of three devisees, and it was held that the royalties were divisible
among the three devisees, though all the wells were sunk on one of
the three lots. This case has been much criticized by the opposing
jurisdictions.
It would seem that this entire question as to the payment of royalty
should be made to depend on the character and legal effect of the
"lease" and the meaning of the term "royalty". Where a lease for
oil andgas purposesis tobe considered a genuine lease, as distinguished
from a mere license, the ordinary rules of landlord and tenant could
be applied to the present case and the question as to the payment of
rent or royalty would be easily solved. That, however, is not the
effect given by all courts to such leases. In a number of cases the
courts have been called upon to determine, whether- an instrument
granting rights to remove minerals or oil in place, constitutes a lease
or mere license. In some jurisdictions it has been held that such
instrument is not a present sale or transfer of the title to the oil, 6 but
merely a grant of possession or license 7 for the purpose of searching
for and producing the oil.'8

The oil itself continues to be realty, and

title to it remains in the grantor, 9 until severed from the realty and
actually possessed.2 0 Other courts have held that they are genuine
9Supra, note 3.
"OIn principal case.
"Supra,
note 3.
12Supra, note 3.
"3Supra, note 3.
'Harness v. Eastern Oil Co., supra,note 3; South Penn Oil Co. v. Snodgrass,
supra, note 3.
15Supra, note 3.
6Osborn v. Ark. Ter. Oil Co., supra, note 2; Wilhiamson v. Jones, 39 W. Va.
231 (1894).

"7Brick Co. v. Pond, 38 Ohio 65 (1882); Funk v. Haldeman, 53 Pa. 229 (1866)
(held to be an incorporeal hereditament or license to mine); N. W. Natural Gas
Co. v. Ullery, supra, note 2.
"Wettengel v. Gormley, supra, note 3; Campbell v. Lynch, supra, note 3;
Brandt v. McKeever, 18 Pa. 70 (1851); Duffield v. Hue, 129 Pa. 94 (1889);
Duffield v. Rosenzweig, 144 Pa. 520 (1891); Union Pet. Co. v. Bliven Pet. Co., 72
Pa. 173 (1872).

"gToothman v. Courtney, 62 W. Va. 167 (907).
"2Williamsonv.Jones, supra, note x6; Kellyv. Ohio Oil Co., 57 Ohio 317 (1897),
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leases, where a present estate in the land and the landowner's qualified
interest in the minerals are vested in the lessee. 1 It is not the form
of the instrument, but rather the intent of the parties gathered from
its terms, that determines whether it is a lease or merely an interest
distinct from the land itself.22
The next question to consider, therefore, is the meaning of the term
"royalty" and the rules applicable in determining to whom such
"royalty" is payable upon division of the land included in the lease.
This, too, is a much disputed question. The decisions in accord with
the principal case declare that royalty is not rent, strictly speaking,
though often termed such." One of the unsatisfactory features of
these opinions, generally, is the absence of definition of the term,
though a few of them seem to treat it as a reservation of the oil and
gas in place.? Ritz, J., in his dissenting opinion in Campbell v. Lynch,
and in his prevailing opinion in the principal case, takes this view, and
compares a lease of this kind to one for quarrying solid minerals. In
those cases the royalty or reservation in the mineral is payable to the
one upon whose land the mineral is obtained.?
This analogy, however, does not seem complete. In the case of
solid minerals, where the exact location of every pound of coal can be
determined, there would be no difficulty in apportioning the royalty.
Each landowner would receive the Toyalty for just those minerals,
taken from under his own land. IHe has not the slightest interest in
minerals taken from the lands of an adjoining landowner, though that
also may be subject to the same lease. Oil and gas on the other hand,
are of a migratory character and no one can tell from whose land they
come. Does the fact that they are immediately taken from the land
of one lessor, entitle him to all the royalty on the oil which was
originally located under the lands of the several lessors? By judiciously
sinking one or two wells on one tract of land, a man may deplete all
the surrounding tracts of land of their oil, and yet none but the owner
of the land upon which the oil is immediately obtained is entitled to
the royalty. In the lease for solid minerals each landowner would
receive a part of the royalty, i. e., on such minerals as are taken from
his land. Applying this rule to an oil lease, all the landowners are
subject to the lease, but only one obtains the royalty or compensation
for the lease, merely because it cannot be determined from whose land
the oil was originally drawn. To permit the lessee and owner of one
parcel of the divided land to irrevocably tie up all the other parcels
and drain the oil and gas out of them is flagrantly inequitable. One
or two wells on one part will completely drain all the others, and yet
their owners, admittedly powerless to prevent it by drilling themselves, or in any other way, are precluded from any share in the
royalties. This makes the lease a burden upon all the subdivisions
2t

Harlan v. Lehigh Coal Co., 35 Pa. 287 (i86o); Duke v. Hague, 107 Pa. 57
(1884); U. S. v. Gratiot, 14 Pet. (U. S.) 526 (i84o); Knight v. Ind. Coal Co., 47
Ind. 1o5 (1874).

'Consolidated Coal Co. v. Peers, 150 IIl. 344 (1894); Baker v. Clark,
i8i (1900).
23N. W. Natural Gas Co. v. Ullery, supra, note 2.
24

2

Toothman v. Courtney, supra, note i9.

6Kelley v. Ohio Oil Co., supra, note

20.
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for the benefit of one. For these reasons the result reached by
Pennsylvania, West Virginia, and California seems far more equitable.
These jurisdictions are of the opinion that royalty reserved on the
amount of mineral taken from the land is properly rent, payable in
kind,261 and thus compare a lease of this kind with an ordinary lease
where the genuine relation of landlord and tenant exists.2 According
to these rules, rent is an incident to the reversion and under an
unqualified grant or transfer of the reversion by the lessor, all the
rents to accrue, pass to his grantee or transferee2 8 and the rule that
the grant of the reversion carries the rent to accrue, applies fully when
the rent is payable in kind.29 Where the reversion is severed, as in the
principal case, the rent which is incident thereto will be apportioned
between the owners of the reversion in proportion to the value of the
respective parts held by each alienee.3 0 Even though the relation of
landlord and tenant does not exist under an oil and gas lease prior to
the discovery of oil, it is clear that afterwards the lessee's estate is no
longer conditional and that such discovery creates the relation of
landlord and tenant until the end of a fixed term. 31
Dorothea Koch, '20.
Sale: Implied warranty of fitness for use desired: Restaurant
supplying food.-Whether a restaurant keeper is liable in implied
warranty of fitness for consumption under the Uniform Sales Act,
when food is furnished to a guest, is the question in Friend v. Childs
DiningHall Company, i2o N. E. (Mass.) 407 (1918.) In this ease the
action was brought to recover for injuries sustained because of the
presence of stones in a dish of baked beans supplied the plaintiff by
a waitress of the defendant company. The plaintiff testified that
there were two or three dark places in the beans that she thought were
hard beans and that she put two or three in her mouth and bit down
hard on them and was hurt. There was no evidence that the plaintiff
had anything further to do with the selection of the beans. Evidence
of express warranty or that the defendant knew of the presence of the
stones in the food was lacking. Plaintiff relied upon an account of
implied warranty of fitness to eat. The defendant introduced no
evidence. Judgment was rendered below for the plaintiff, and the
question on appeal was whether the plaintiff should have been allowed
to go to the jury with her case; a majority of the upper court held
that the case was properly submitted to the jury.
The decision was reached under section :1 of the Uniform Sales
Act, which provides, "Where the buyer, expressly or by implication
makes known to the seller the particular purpose for which the goods
are required, and it appears that the buyer relies upon the seller's skill
2
'Reg. v. Westbrook, ioQ. B. (Eng.) 178 (2847); U. S. v. Gratiot, supra, note
21; Campbell v. Lynch, supra,note I; Lynch v. Davis, supra, note 3; Higgins v.
Cal.
Pet. Co., supra,note 3.
2
7Tettengel v. Gormley, supra, note 3.
28
Pagev. Lashley, i Ind. 152 (i86o); Gibbons v. Dillingham, ioArk. 9 (1849).
29
Schell v. Simon, 66 Cal. 264 (1884); Townsend v. Isenberger, 45 Iowa 670
(1877).
30
Worthington v. Cooke, 56 Md. 51 (188o); Biddle v. Hussman, 23 Mo. 597
(O856).
31
Lowther Oil Co. v. illier-Sibley Oil Co., 53 W. Va. 502 (2903).
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or judgment, whether he be the grower or manufacturer or not, there
is an implied warranty that the goods shall be reasonably fit for such
purpose." Thus if there is a sale of goods where a patron of a restaurant is served with food, there is an implied warranty of fitness for
consumption.
At common law dealers in food were liable in implied warranty
of fitness for consumption in case of sale for immediate consumption.'
Before the adoption of the Uniform Sales Act, New York was in
accord with this rule. 2 In Race v. Krum1 the Appellate Division
applied the same rule under the Sales Act. This decision has, how-4
ever, been disapproved in a recent decision by the Court of Appeals,
in which the court holds that a dealer in food is liable in implied
warranty of fitness for consumption only when the buyer expressly
or by implication acquaints the dealer with the purpose of the purchase, and the dealer's skill or judgment in the selection of the food is
relied upon. This was decided under section 15 of the Uniform Sales
Act (section 96 of the Personal Property Law of New York). By this
decision the dealer in foodstuffs is placed in the same category as all
other vendees, as to his liability in fitness for the purpose for which the
article is required, which would seem to be the result intended by the
section of the Sales Act.
The majority of the court in the present action rely greatly upon
numerous decisions holding that the inclusion in a meal of articles of
food, the sale of which is prohibited by criminal statutes, the meal
alone being charged for, was a sale of the articles within the terms of
such statutes.5 The court says, "There is strong ground for holding
that the contract between one who keeps a restaurant and one who
resorts there for food to be served and eaten on the premises is a sale
of food." It is to be noted that the prohibitions of sale were all
under criminal statutes and involved no civil liability from contract.
Mr. Justice Crosby says in his dissenting opinion in the principal case,
"Manifestly the court never intended by the judgment in those cases
to decide that the furnishing of food to a guest created a contract of
sale which carried with it an implied warranty that the food furnished
was sound."
There is apparently no decision of a court of last resort that the
furnishing of food by a restaurant keeper constitutes a contract of sale
of such food. At early common law recovery was allowed against a
tavern keeper or innkeeper under the theory of implied covenant of
fitness to eat, and these decisions are viewed by the court as applicable
to the question in hand; but they seem to have been made under an
ancient statute imposing a penalty for furnishing deleterious food, the
action being, in the language of the courts, "against the common'Bigge v. Parkinson, 7 H. & N. (Eng.) 955 (1862); Jones v. Just, L. R. 3 Q.
B. (Eiig.) 197 (1868).
2Moses v. Mead, I Denio (N.Y.) 378 (1845), affirmed 5 Denio(N. Y.) 617 (1846).
3Racev. Krum, 163 App. Div. (N. Y.) 924 (19i4); see also upon this case a
note in I CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY 316, and Bogert, Sale of Goods, p. 79.
4Rinaldi v. The Mohican Company, 225 N. Y. 70 (1918).
'Commonwealth v. Worcester, 126 Mass. 256 (1879); State v. Lotti, 72 Vt. I I5
(i9oo); Commonwealth v. Warren, x6o iass. 533 (1894); People v. Clair, 221
N. Y. 108 (1917).
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wealth."'8 On the other hand it has been held that such is not a sale
of food, either at common law7 or under the Sales Act." It is declared
that the customer cannot carry away any of the food, but can only
consume so much as he desires. The charge made is not only for the
food consumed, but includes the furnishing of a place where it may
be eaten and service rendered in connection therewith.
The court says that the necessity of implying a warranty of fitness
to eat, in the furnishing of food by a keeper of a restaurant, is as great
as in the case where food is supplied by a dealer for immediate consumption. The analogy drawn by the court seems to be logical;
the courts have, however, generally refused to apply it in cases where
the sale was by any one other than a dealer. 9
The majority opinion of the court does not discuss the question of
whether the food furnished can be held to be goods under the Sales
Act. The dissenting opinion holds that the food is not goods under
the act, even if the transaction is a sale.
In New York the decisions are not entirely in accord. In the
Appellate Division it has been held that there is an implied warranty
of fitness to eat in the sale of ice cream by the proprietor of a sofda
water fountain.10 The answer in this case, however, admitted an
allegation in the complaint that the defendant in selling the cream
to the plaintiff "warranted it to be wholesome." This court later
held that there is such an implied warranty in the furnishing of food
by a restaurant.
The case of the sale of ice cream went to the Court
of Appeals 12 which held that there was an implied warranty, but the
court said, "It must be borne in mind that we are not dealing with the
liability of hotel proprietors, restaurant keepers, dining car managers
or people engaged in business of that kind, but are considering solely
the liability of a dealer who makes or prepares the articles that he is
selling." The two seem much alike on theory, and it is hard to see
how the court would distinguish them, unless it would call the
furnishing of the ice cream a sale of it, and the furnishing of the food,
because it is accompanied by the requisite service, etc., a license to eat
the food only. It is, however, so much a matter of degree of service
that it is difficult to see how the cases could be distinguished on this
ground. The case decided could have gone off on the ground of the
admission of an implied warranty in the answer, although the
upper court does not make mention of this fact.
Unless a hotel or restaurant keeper is held under implied warranty
in this class of cases it would seem practically impossible for a patron
to recover for the serving of deleterious food. Negligence on the part
of the hotel keeper is difficult to prove, as the defect is practically
6Roswel v. Vaughan, 3 Croc. Jac. (Eng.) 196; Benjamin, Sales (Ed. 1888),

604;
Williston, Sales,
7

241.

Sheffer v. Willoughby, 163 Ill. 518 (1896); Travis v. L. & N. R. R. Co., 183
Ala.
415 (1913); Valeri v. Pullman Co., 218 Fed 519 (I914).
8
Merrill v. Hodson, 88 Conn. 314 (1914).
9
Giroux v. Stedman, 145 Mass. 439 (1888); Howard v. Emerson, 11o Mass.
320 (1872).

"Race v. Krum, supra, note 3.
"Leahy v. Essex Co., x64 App. Div. (N. Y.) 9o3 (1914).
"2Race v. Krum, 222 N. Y. 410 (1918).
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always latent, and upon proof of the cleanliness of the kitchen and the
care in the selection and preparation of the food, the hotel keeper
stands upon almost impregnable grounds. This is true especially in
the larger hotels where the transactions undergone in the purchase
and preparation of a single item would be hard to trace. To so
excuse the hotel or restaurant keeper the somewhat disputable conclusion, that there is no sale of the food, must be reached, and from the
lack of desirability of this it is believed that the courts may well hold
that such persons are liable in implied warranty of fitness for consumption in the furnishing of food in a meal.
C. F. Reavis, Jr., 'I9.
Specific Performance: Options: Sufficiency of seal without
consideration.---'The late case of Thomasonv. Bescher, 97 S. E. (N.C.)
654 (i98), again raises the question whether, on a bill in equity to
compel specific performance of an option to purchase under seal, where
there has been an attempted revocation before the time limited has
expired, and before acceptance by the optionee, the court may not go
behind the seal and if no consideration in fact is found refuse specific
performance.
The facts of the instant case, as found by a reference to a jury, show
an option to purchase, under seal, reciting a consideration of one
dollar in hand paid, giving plaintiff Thomason the option to purchase
certain lands from the defendants within a certain time. Five days
after giving the option, and within the time limited, the defendants
served Thomason with a notice of withdrawal of the offer. Prior to
the receipt of this notice Thomason had notified one of the two
defendants of his acceptance of the offer, and performance was
tendered within the time limited. The defendants refused to convey
and relied upon their notice of withdrawal, whereupon Thomason,
together with one Curry to whom he had assigned a one-half interest
in the contract, brought a bill in equity to compel specific performance. Though there was a recitation of consideration in the instrument the jury found no actual consideration had been paid for the
option, yet the court held' "that the defendants were bound by their
covenant under seal and not at liberty to withdraw their offer before
the expiration of the time agreed upon. The verdict having established that, before any, attempted withdrawal by defendants, plaintiff
had notified one of the parties of acceptance, would in any event be
entitled to judgment as to that interest." Specific performance was
decreed as to both interests.
For the purposes of a law action, where the common law rule has
not been abrogated or modified, a seal will be held to import a good
consideration and law remedies granted although no consideration in
fact be found.3 But in equity the principle is quite as positively
stated that to be entitled to the remedy of specific performance the
court will look for actual consideration, and if none or an inadequate
'For general treatment see notes in i Ann. Cas. 990; 12 Ann. Cas. 90; Ann.
Cas. i913A, 362; 21 L. R. A. 127; 6 L. R. A. (N. S.) 403; 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 317.
2At page 656.
313 Corp. utr. 295, section I05, with cases there cited.
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consideration be found, hen the equitable relief prayed will be
though the promise was in the form of a covenant
refused, even
4
under seal.
Much confusion has arisen in the application of this latter rule to
the case of a voluntary option under seal. It is well settled that an
option founded upon good consideration may be enforced, 5 and it is
frequently said that the presence of a seal imports good consideration
although no consideration in fact be found.' If this be taken to mean
that a voluntary option under seal, if accepted within the time limited
notwithstanding an attempted withdrawal, is enforceable by the
equitable remedy of specific performance, (and such is the contention
of the principal case) then the result conflicts with the principle of
equity that specific performance will be decreed only of promises
supported by a good consideration. It is to be noted, however, that
the specific performance is not of the offer itself, but of the contract of
sale formed by the optionee's acceptance. The very act of bringing7
the bill to compel performance is held to constitute an acceptance.
If the offer is still open when accepted, though itself founded upon no
consideration, then the promise to pay furnishes the consideration for
the contract sought to be enforced. Hence the argument might be
advanced that, inasmuch as the bill is not to enforce performance of
the offer but the contract formed by an acceptance of the offer, the
equitable rule stated would be inapplicable. But while technically
logical, it is doubtful if an equity court would consider such an
objection seriously, for the offer and contract are so closely related as
to be for all practical purposes indistinguishable, and to compel
performance of the contract would indirectly compel the option to be
held open for the period stipulated without other consideration than
that imported by the seal, and equity refuses to do so.
The cases cited in the principal case as authorities seem to lay
down a rule which is well illustrated by a quotation from the case of
Watkins v. Robertson," and was adopted by the opinion of the principal
case, to the following effect: "That an option under seal for the sale
of shares in a joint-stock company is a binding offer from which the
promisor cannot recede during the time stipulated for in the option,
and, if accepted during that time, constitutes a contract the specific
performance of which a court of equity will compel. The option is in
the nature of a continuing offer to sell, and, being under seal, must
be regarded as made upon a sufficient consideration, and no proof
to the contrary will be received at law or in equity." But with the
exception of O'Brien v. Boland,9 the rule so laid down is broader than
the facts of the cases decided justify, and must be considered as
dictum.
Watkins v. Robertson,10 from which the above quotation is taken,
43 Pomeroy's Eq. Jur. (4th ed.) section 1293.
5Supra, note i.
OSupra, note I; Watkins v. Robertson,

1667 Mass. 481 (1896).

1o5

Va. 269 (i9o6); O'Brien v. Boland,

Sayward v. Houghton, ii9 Cal. 545 (1898); Maughlin v. Perry, 35 Md. 352
Woodruff v. Woodruff, 44 N. J. Eq. 349 (1888).
(I87i);
8
Supra, note 6.
9
Supra, note 6.
"0Supra, note 6.
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and supposed to be the leading case in support of the rule stated, may
be correctly decided on its facts, but the facts do not justify the broad
rule there laid down. The case involved an option under seal falsely
reciting a consideration of one dollar in hand paid, and having come
into the hands of innocent third parties who sought specific performance, it was held that as to these parties the defendant was estopped
from denying the truthfulness of the recitation of consideration. The
second citation in support of the rule of the principal case was Willard
v. Tayloe." The facts there show that the offer was accepted before
any attempt at revocation, thus constituting a binding contract by
offer and acceptance. Hence the discussion as to the effect of the seal
was dictum. Numerous other cases are readily distinguishable on
this ground.12 McMillan v. Ames," cited and quoted from in support
of the principal case, was decided on inadequate reasoning, and entirely
failed to consider an earlier case in the same jurisdiction announcing
the contrary doctrine. 14 It was explained by a later adjudication of
the same court taking a view quite opposite to the rule of the principal
case.15 Weaver v. Burr8 involved a simple written option without
seal or consideration, and specific performance was denied because
there had been no unconditional acceptance within the time limited.
The discussion as to the seal was dictum.
A large number of other cases are to be distinguished on the ground
that good consideration for the option was found, and there was no
necessity of relying upon the seal to import the irrevocability of the
offer.'7
There are several cases taking the view contrary to the principal
case.' 8 Research discloses but one case in which the rule contended
for by the principal case was directly presented and expressly decided
118 Wall. (U. S.) 557 (1869).
12Guyer v. Warren, 175 Ill. 328 (1898); Central Land Co. v. Johnston, 85 Va.

223 (1897); Donnallyv. Parker, 5W.Va. 301(I872); Dunlop v. Baker,

239

Fed.

193 (1916).

Minn. 257 (1885).
' 4Lamprey v. Lamprey, 29 Minn. 151 (1882).
'Storch v. Duhnke, 76 Minn. 521 (1899).
1333

1631
W. Va. 736 (1888)
7

Smith v. Smith, 36 Ga. x84 (1867), involves an option founded upon a copromise of a disputed claim, thus constituting good consideration. Simms v.
Lide, 94 Ga. 553 (1894), involved an actual consideration of five dollars paid.
Black v. Maddox, io4 Ga. 157 (i898), involved not only consideration paid, but
was decided in the light of an express statute declaring that a seal conclusively
imported a good consideration and no averment to the contrary wouldbereceived.
See Georgia Code of 1895, section 3656. Hayes v. O'Brien, 149 Ill. 403, 412
(1894), while declaring the sufficiency of the seal, held that even if no seal were
found yet a good consideration supported the option in that "the privilege of
becoming a purchaser of the premises formed at least a part of the inducement
and consideration for the acceptance of the lease by the lessee." Guyer v.
Warren, supra, note 12, was a case where the option was not only accepted before
an attempted revocation, but an actual consideration of one dollar was found
which the court declared adequate.
"'Rude v. Levy, 43 Colo. 482 (i9o8); Smith v. Reynolds, 8 Fed. 696 (i88o);
Crandall v. Willig, 166 Ill. 233 (1897); Corbett v. Cronkhite, 239 IU.9 (1909);
Storch v. Duhnke, supra, note 15, explaining McMillan v. Ames, supra, note i3;
Graybill v. Brugh, 89 Va. 895 (1893). It has been said that this latter case was
overruled by Cummins v. Beavers, 103 Va. 230 (1904), but they both seem to hold

directly contrary to the principal case.
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in accordance with the rule announced,19 and this case was without
doubt largely influenced by the dictain the cases discussed. A quota20
sufficientlv illustrates the reasoning of
tion from Corbettv. Cronkhite
the contrary view. The court said: "The contract is silent on the
question of consideration. Does the seal import such a consideration
that the real consideration cannot be inquired into in a specific performance proceeding in equity? We think not. 'Equity will never
enforce an executory agreement unle s there was an actual valuable
consideration, and, unlike the common law, it does not permit a seal
to supply the place of a real consideration. Disregarding mere forms
and looking at the reality, it requires an actual valuable consideration
as essential in every such agreement, and allows the want of it to be
shown, notwithstanding the seal, in the enforcement of covenants,
settlements and executory contracts of every description.' 3 Pomeroy's Eq.Jur. ( 3 d. ed.) sec. 1293. * * * The rule as quoted above
from Pomeroy was referred to with approval by this court in Crandall
v. Willig, x66 Ill. 233, where it was said (p. 239): 'True, the contract
was under seal and purported to be based upon the nominal consideration of one dollar; but the evidence showed that there was, in fact, no
consideration whatever, and it is well settled that in equity the real
consideration may be inquired into, and the parties are not concluded'
by the recitals in the contract, though under seal.' "
It might be suggested that the difference of authority falls along the
line of the common law distinction as to the rebuttable or conclusive
presumption of consideration imported by the seal, but research fails
to bear out such a suggestion, the conflicting jurisdictions generally
adhering to the strict rule of conclusive presumption. It is to be
noted, however, that the North Carolina courts have upheld specialities, not because the seal imported a consideration, but because of the
solemnity of the execution of a specialty. 21
It would seem that the principal case is not only against the weight
of authority 22
but is improperly decided upon principles of equity
jurisprudence.
'FredericM. Hoskins, 'i9.
Torts: Libel and slander: Petition for pardon: Privileged communications.--The recent case of Andrews v. Gardiner,224 N. Y. 44o
(x r8), declared that statements assailing the plaintiff's character,
contained in a petition drawn by the defendant as counsel and submitted to the governor to secure the pardon of one Conrad, who had
been convicted of the crime of attempted abortion, were not protected
by an absolute privilege. The plaintiff, as attorney for a medical
society, had been mainly responsible for Conrad's conviction, and it
was also through the society's protest at the plaintiff's instance that
the defendant's first attempt to obtain a pardon failed. The defendant included in the petition the statements charged as libellous in
order to discount the rejection of his first petition, and to show espec1"O'Brien v. Boland supra, note 6.
20239 Ill. 9, 14 (9o9).
'1Walker v. Walker, 13 Ire. Law (N. C.) 335 (1852).
nSee notes in I Cal. L. Rev. 222, 227 and 23 Yale L. J.
view contrary to the principal holding.

641,

645, adopting the
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ially that the plaintiff's character was unworthy, and that Conrad was
a victimlof the plaintiff's practices of working up false charges against
innocent persons for the purpose of blackmail. The Court of Appeals,
reversing the Appellate Division, held that the statements made were
pertinent to the issue; that if made in good faith they were not
actionable, notwithstanding their falsity; but if the statements were
false and not made in good faith they were actionable.
The exact question presented by the case is whether upon the facts
involved the privilege as to the alleged libel was correctly decided to
be qualified and not absolute. The advantages of absolute privilege
as a defense are very marked, for in a case where it is applicable, the
statements in question are not actionable, if relevant even though false
in fact, and made maliciously.' A qualified privilege, on the other
hand, is lost when, upon proof of falsity, malicious motives are shown
to have prompted the words.2 Although only one of the cases cited
in the principal case was directly in point, and this contrato the holding of the court, 3 it is submitted that the court is correct in holding
that absolute privilege should not be granted as to allegations of fact
in a petition for pardon to a governor or other executive officer.
.The rule is that absolute privilege extends to a person in respect of
any statements, oral or written, made in the course of a judicial
proceeding, and pertinent thereto. 4 This right is equally enjoyed by
counsel, parties, and witnesses. 5 And as Lord Esher said in Royal
Aquarium v. Parkinson,6 "it seems the doctrine has been carried
further and the immunity applies wherever there is an authorized
inquiry which, though not before a court of justice, is before a tribunal
with similar attributes." The proceeding in a petition for pardon
before a governor cannot reasonably, it would seem, be characterized
as a court proceeding, or one with similar attributes, because it is
generally an informal appeal for grace and mercy and having no
clearly defined issues. In large measure also the rules followed, the
arguments presented, or the motives appealed to do not belong to
jurisprudence. In accord with this view it was declared as early as
1576 that petitions or complaints to high officials are only qualifiedly
privileged,7 and a long line of authority reaching to the present
upholds this proposition.8 And so a general rule has been evolved
1
2Conley v. Key, 98 Ga. ii5 (1895).
Wright v. Lothrop, 149 Mass. 349
3

(1889).
Connellee v. Blanton, 163 S. W. (Tex. Civ. App.) 85 (1914).
'Youmans v. Smith, 153 N. Y. 214 (1897); Moore v. Manfr's. Natl. Bk., 123
N. Y. 42o (189o); McLaughlin v. Cowley, 127 Mass. 316 (1879): Barnett v.
Loud, 226 Mass. 447 (917); Kemper v. Fort, 219 Pa. St. 85 (1907); Sickles v.
Kling, 60 App. Div. (N. Y.) 55 (i9oi).
sMunster v. Lamb, i Q. B. D. (Eng.) 588 (1883); Revis v. Smith, 18 C. B.
(Eng.) 126 (1856); Garr v. Selden, 4 N. Y. 91 (185o); Kemper v. Fort, supra,
note 4, at page 89; Laing v. Mitten, 185 Mass. 233 235 (1904).
6Royal Aquarium v. Parkinson, I Q. B. D. (Eng.) 43I, 442 (1892); Dawkins v.
Lord Rokeby, L. R. 8 Q. B. (Eng.) 255 (2873).
7Hatev. Meller, 3 Lem. (Eng.) 18 (i856), dictum.
sBingham v. Gaynor, 203 N. Y. 27, 32, 32 (i9i1); Woods v. Wiman, 122 N. Y.
445 (1890); Cook v. Hill, 3 Sandf. Super. Ct. (N. Y.) 341 (1849); Maurice v.
Worden, 54 Md. 233 (I88O); Gray v. Pentland, 2 Serg. & R. (Pa.) 23 (185);
Frank v. Dessena, 5 N. J. L, J. i85 (1882).
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assigning qualified privilege to public proceedings which are official
and public, but not in substance judicial. 9
There appear to be some important exceptions to this rule, however.
Statements made in legislative proceedings are absolutely privileged, 1
and in England the trend has been to treat any inquiry before a committee appointed by the House of Commons in like manner." This
tendency has led courts to apply the same rule to administrative
proceedings concerned with ordinary discretionary matters. 12 A
situation therefore results wherein an absolute privilege is granted in
proceedings no more judicial in character than a hearing before a
governor on a petition for pardon. These cases are, however, based
distinctly on the ground that the proceedings referred to are judicial
in character within the meaning of the rule as the scope of absolute
privilege, and this reasoning is unsatisfactory, as it seems clear that
-proceedings of this sort are not judicial in the proper sense. There
-exists no power to compel the testimony of witnesses, for instance.
Certainly, the characteristics of a judicial proceeding in the strict
,sense, defined in the line of decisions as to what functions may properly
be delegated to the judiciary under our constitutional system, are not
present in the proceedings under discussion.13 It is suggested that
these cases are exceptional and from the viewpoint of American
authority are incorrect, as they assert a doctrine influenced by an
improper extension of the English view. Other cases in this country
correctly disregard the suggested general assimilation of administrative or legislative hearings to a judicial hearing and determinewhether
absolute privilege exists or not, as to words spoken during such proceedings, by the test of whether or not the proceeding was actually
judicial in the particular instance. 14
The tendency of the courts in refusing to extend absolute privilege
beyond strictly legislative or judicial proceedings is illustrated in
another field in the assignment of qualified privilege only to communications between officers of government. 5 Much more cogent arguments can be advanced for according absolute privilege to such communications than for regarding petitions for pardon as absolutely
privileged. It is extremely important that the relations of the higher
executive officers, especially, be not hampered by fears of personal
9
Proctor v. Webster, 16 Q. B. D. (Eng.) 112, 114 (1885); Royal Acquariun v.
Parkinson, supra, note 6; Blakeslee v. Carroll, 64 Conn. 223 (1894); Wright v.
Lothrop, supra, note 2.
1Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. I (18o8).
"Lake
v. King, r Win. Sanders (Eng.) 137 (1668).
12Jones v. Forehand, 89 Ga. 520 (1892) (hearing before an arbitrator to appraise
property); Rogers v. Thompson, 89 N. J. L. 639 (1916) (meeting held by a referee
in bankruptcy to determine election of a trustee); Newfield v. Copperman, 15
Abb. Prac. (N. S.) (N. Y.) 36o (1873) (complaint to afire marshal to institute an
inquiry into the cause of a fire); Gattis v. Kilgo, 125 N. C. x33 (1899) (petition
to city council on the misconduct of an officer); Larkin v. Noonan, 19 Wis. 93,

(1865):
13

2 Muskrat v. United States, 219 U. S. 346 (i9io).
14Blakeslee v. Carroll, supra, note 9; Thorn v. Blanchard, 5 Johns. (N. Y.)

507 (1809); Woods v. Wiman, supra, note 8; Kemper v. Fort, supra, note 4;
Jones v. Forehand, supra, note 12.
lIsStevensonv. Ward, 48 App. Div. (N.Y.) 291 (1900); Pearce v. Brower, 72 Ga.
243 (1884); De Arnaud v. Ainsworth, 24 App. Cases (D. C.) 167 (1904).
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civil liability."6 But clearly, if the result reached by the weight of
authority on this point be sound, it seems reasonable to place a
similar limitation upon a private individual in an application for
pardon.
The public interest does not require that a convicted criminal be
accorded an absolute privilege as to statements made in application
for pardon. The doctrine of absolute privilege as to statements made
in judicial proceedings has been built up on the theory that, in the
assertion of a right or the redress of a wrong one should not be fettered
in anything he might wish to say, since fear of liability therefor might
deter him in seeking justice. This reason has not the same force
where one is seeking clemency. An applicant for clemency has so
much to gain and in comparison so little to lose that it is safe to say
that the deterrent of a possible libel suit would not materially influence
his action. But a more important consideration is that there is
obviously not the same public interest in protecting statements of a
criminal in an application for discretionary leniency that there is in
protecting statements made to assert fundamental legal rights.
Furthermore, recent experience in some jurisdictions shows that the.
public interest is menaced by an excessive use of the pardoning power,
rather than by any undue restriction upon the approach to the source
of executive grace. In applications for pardon a wide field is open to
the petitioner, and he may plead in his own behalf practically without
limit, as to the nature of the considerations adduced. Furthermore,
under the rule of the principal case, the petitioner and his counsel
are protected as to all relevant statements of fact advanced in good
faith, even though not true in fact. But the liberality of this rule
should not be carried farther. It is no hardship for one seeking indulgence that he be required to act in good faith.
Eugene F. Gilligan, '19.
Vested, Contingent and Future Interests: Remainders to undetermined persons: New York statutory [rule.-In Doctor v. Hughes,
225 N. Y. (1919), real property was conveyed to a trustee in trust for
the use of the grantor for life, with power in the trustee to sell, and
with direction that upon the death of the grantor the trustee should
convey the realty, or its avails, if sold, to the heirs at law of the
grantor. During the lifetime of the grantor, a judgment was recovered
against the grantor's daughter, and the question was whether the
presumptive heir had any interest in the property which could be
reached by execution. It was held that the direction concerning the
remainder was "the superfluous expression of a duty imposed by law,"
under the statute providing for the reversion of such an estate,' and
that the heirs had "an expectancy, but no estate."
Although the case thus passes off satisfactorily on the principle of a
reversion, Judge Cardozo in his opinion touches upon the question of
remainders in words which are, perhaps, significant for their bluntness
in reiterating a much criticized doctrine in the law of real property in
this state.--"There is no doubt that a gift to A for life with remainder
16Gardner v. Anderson, Fed. Cases, No. 5220 (Md.) (1876).
'Real Property Law, sec. 102.
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to A's heirs, gives to such heirs a vested, though defeasible, estate."
This proposition was first expounded authoritatively in the case of
Moore v. Littel,2 but was there laid down much more broadly. The
case undertook to interpret the definitions of vested and contingent
remainders contained in the Revised Statutes,-"A future estate is
either vested or contingent. It is vested, when there is a person in
being, who would have an immediate right to the possession of the
property, on the determination of all the intermediate or precedent
estates. It is contingent while the person to whom or the event on
which it is limited to take effect remains uncertain."3 It was held
that the statute altered the common law,4 and it would seem correctly.5 Judge Woodruff, reading the language of the statute
"according to its natural and ordinary signification," said,8 "If you
can point to a man, woman or child who, if the life estate should now
cease, would, eo instanti et ipso facto, have an immediate right of
possession, then the remainder is vested." Even those who approve
of the decision in Moore v. Littel admit that its results may be "start'ling," 7 and it is not strange, therefore, that many inroads have been
made upon the broad doctrine as laid down in 1869.
Under Judge Woodruff's opinion, a gift in remainder to the children
of the life tenant would universally be held vested, as the children, if
he has any, are as easily ascertainable as his prospective heirs. Yet
very soon after that decision was rendered, there arose a conflict on
this point. A partial harmonizing of the cases seems possible by
holding the remainder vested where limited to the "children of A," or
"to the children of A, and if any should die before him, the heirs of
that child to take by representation,"" and contingent where left to
"surviving children." 9 But we can. find exceptions to both of these
classifications. Where a remainder was left to the children of the life
tenant, "the issue of any child who may be dead to take," it was held
that the wording of the latter portion negatived the idea that the
estate was to vest in the children during the life of their mother.' 0 In
another case, the testator left the land to his widow "during her life;
remainder to such of my children as may then be alive,"" and it was
held that a vested remainder was created because the word "then"
N. Y. 66 (1869).
Real Property Law, see. 40.
'At common law "vested remainders are where the estate is invariably fixed to
remain to a determinate person after the particular estate is spent." i Cooley's
Blackstone Bk. 2 p. 169. To be a vested remainder the remainder-man must be
"certain to come into possession immediately upon the determination of the
precedent estate." Johnson v. Edmond, 65 Conn.492 (1895).
6Gray on Perpetuities, sec. 107.
6p. 80.
7Gray, see. 1o7.
"Livingston v. Greene, 52 N. Y. 118 (1873); Embury v. Sheldon, 68 N. Y. 227
(1877); Byrnes v. Stilwell, lo5 N. Y. 453 (1886); Gcerlitz v. Malawista, 56 Hun
(N.Y.) 120 (18go), affirmed, 13o N. Y. 688 (1892); Camp v. Cronkright, 59 Hun
(N. Y.) 488 (189I); Ackerman v. Ackerman, 63 App. Div. (N. Y.) 370 (1901);
Ranhofer
v. Hall Realty Co., 143 App. Div. (N. Y.) 237 (1911).
9
Carmichpl v. Carmichal, 4 Keyes (N. Y.) 346 (1868); Hennessy v. Patterson,
85 N. Y. 91 (1881); Purdyv. Hayt, 92 N. Y. 446 (1883); Townshend v. Fromnmer,
1240 N. Y. 446 (1891); Geisse v. Bunce, 23 App. Div. (N. Y.) 289 (1897).
' Clark v. Cammann, x6o N. Y. 315 (1899).
"Connelly v. O'Brien, 166 N. Y. 406 (I9oi).
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referred to the phrase "during her life." It would seem that if the
phrase had been instead "until her death," the remainder would have
been contingent under this reasoning.
These cases which are out of line indicate that attempts to classify
the decisions must all give way to the intent of the testator as gathered
from the will; in other words, that the rules are rules of construction
and not of property. Where the intent of the testator "is clearly, or
sufciently, manifest,
it must control, without regard to general rules
2
of construction.'
A direction to divide and pay over the property to the remaindermen upon the death of the life tenant will ordinarily make the
remainder contingent, but here, too, the rule is simply one of construction. 3 This provision in wills has caused more litigation than
any other,14 and the analysis of this class of cases is beyond the scope
of this note.
The effect of New York's attempt to clarify the distinction between
vested and contingent remainders in the Revised Statutes has
extended beyond the borders of this state. In Michigan and Wisconsin, the New York statutory definitions have been copied,1 5 and it is
interesting, perhaps, to note that similar confusion has arisen in those
states from accepting the interpretation of the statute announced in
Moore v. LiUel.16
As we have seen, there is a difference between the common law
definition of vested and contingent remainders and the statutory one.
As early as 1836 it was said that the "determinate" idea of the person
to take, as contained in the common law definition, was eliminated
by the statute,17 and Moore v. Littel, of course, took this view. Later
cases have brought back the determinate idea in a modified form, thus
exhibiting "the tenacity with which courts cling to common-law
principles even after displaced by a plain statute.""' The result is the
curious situation now existing, under which "heirs" take a vested
interest, while the interest of "surviving children," who are equally
ready to take should the life interest now cease, is contingent.
As a practical matter it is best to consider such remainders vested
in some person, who may represent the property as a whole, even
though others may come later who have an interest therein. An
element of certainty is added to future estates, which in many cases
is helpful. To hold such future estates vested if possible has been
1

2Roosa v. Harrington, 171 N. Y. 341 (1902).
1
' Warner v. Durant, 76 N. Y. 133 (1879); Smith v. Edwards, 88 N. Y. 92
(1882); Shipman v. Rollins, 98 N. Y. 311 (1885); Delafield v. Shipman, io3
N.Y. 463 (1886); In Re Tienken, 131 N. Y. 391 (1892).
HIn Cammann v. Bailey, 21o N. Y. 19 (1913), CULLEN, C. J., said, "The result
of the rule as to the construction of a gift, confined to a mere direction to divide
and pay over, has been productive of more litigation than any other rule as to the
construction of wills." For comprehensive note on so-called "divide and pay
over rule," see L. R. A. 1918 E, p. 1097.
15Vol. 4, Howell's Michigan Statutes, sec. io635; Wisconsin Statutes, Chap. 95,
sec.16 2037.
See Porter v. Osmun, 135 Mich. 361 (1904); In Re Moran's Will, i I8 Wis. 177
(1903);
McMichael v. Peterman, 140 Wis. 589 (19o9).
17
Coster v. Lorillard, 14 Wend. (N. Y.) 265 (1836).
Isln Re Moran's Will, supra, note 16.
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called "a rule of convenience, and almost of necessity."' 9 Accordingly, it is not surprising that, as evidenced by the dictum in the
principal case and in other recent cases, 20 there is no present desire
on the part of the courts to set aside Moore v. Liftel, and its rule must
be accepted as one of the anomalies of the law of real property.
Malcolm B. Carroll, 'ii#.
"Kent
v. Church of St. Michael, 136 N. Y. 1o (1892).
2
'Clowe v. Seavey, 208 N. Y. 496 (1913); Crackanthorpe v. Sickles, i56 App.

Div. (N. Y.) 753 (1913); Wright v. Clark, 81 Misc. (N.Y.) 527 (1913).

